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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a collection of three essays which examine issues at the intersection
of international economics, political economy, and macroeconomics. A common theme
which emerges in the subsequent chapters is a reliance on intuitive models of economies
populated by rational agents engaging in both political and economic decisionmaking.
Each chapter also presents empirical evidence using aggregate data to highlight new
angles on issues related to macroeconomic development policy.
Concurrent cross-country political change, such as the recent “Arab spring” revo-
lutions in the Middle East, the experience of South American military dictatorships in
the 1970s and 1980s, and political transition in former Soviet-bloc countries at the end
of the Cold War, suggests that global forces impacting multiple countries can serve as a
trigger for intrastate conflict. A common conjecture is that economic forces have been a
primary impetus for such episodes. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of worldwide
commodity price fluctuations in generating political conflict in developing countries. I
develop a simple model to show that shocks to both the level and uncertainty of com-
modity export prices can elicit conflict events in developing countries. Econometric
evidence from a dataset combining major intrastate political resistance campaigns and
global food commodity price data lends support to this hypothesis.
In the second chapter, I examine whether corruption within one country affected by
corruption within another. Understanding the interactions between political-economic
culture across countries can allow us to better grasp the implications of greater global
and regional integration in recent history. Until now, few studies have examined this
question in detail due to the difficulty of measuring corruption and paucity of consistent
data over an adequate time span. I use a panel dataset of countries in Asia, Latin
America, and the Middle East over a span of fifteen years to examine how domestic
corruption reacts to the culture of corruption in the region in which the country is
located. Contrary to the results of past literature, I find evidence that a reduction in
regional corruption can actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country,
and vice versa. If in an open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that
a rent-seeking government can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the
marginal benefit of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by increasing the pool
of exploitable funds. My results offer an economic reason for why corruption will be an
enduring institution in a more interconnected world.
Finally, are less democratic governments more apt to intervene in the prices of im-
ported goods than exported goods? In the third chapter of this dissertation I offer an
explanation for why this might be the case, focusing on a government’s choice between
two alternative interventionist trade policies: import tariffs and export subsidies. If
governments have incentives to exploit their political power to extract rents from citi-
zens, they can achieve this by taxing imports rather than subsidizing exports. However,
if citizens are able to discipline their governments through elections, the extent of this
rent-seeking behavior can be constrained. I present a model that captures this behavior,
distinguishing between the level of electoral accountability of a government and the level
of bargaining power that citizens have in negotiations. Preliminary empirical evidence
is presented which suggests that more authoritarian countries spend greater amounts
on import tariffs than on export subsidies. These findings give insight into some of the
challenges in establishing free trade amongst countries with different attitudes toward
democratic institutions, both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral organizations.
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Chapter 1
Price Fluctuations and Political
Conflict
1.1 Introduction
Concurrent cross-country political change, such as the recent “Arab spring” revolutions
in the Middle East, the experience of South American military dictatorships in the
1970s and 1980s, and political transition in former Soviet-bloc countries at the end of
the Cold War, suggests that global forces impacting multiple countries can serve as a
trigger for intrastate conflict. A common conjecture is that economic forces, and in
particular global prices, have been a primary impetus for such episodes. For example,
The Economist newspaper on 26 February 2011 argued that “Discontent over rising
bread prices has played a part in the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East,”
and on 28 May 2011 noted that “Rising prices can cause mayhem....In some African
markets maize and wheat prices have risen by 30% this year. Political tension invariably
rises, too.” In this paper, I argue that this portrayal of the effect of prices on political
conflict is overly simplistic. I show that fluctuations in food commodity price levels
and in commodity price uncertainty have distinct effects on civil conflict occurrence in
developing countries: when a country is a net exporter of a commodity, falling (rather
than rising) relative price levels lead to political tumult while an increase in uncertainty
regarding the relative price of commodity exports has the same effect.
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Despite the popularity of the view that movements in prices can cause political
turmoil, research into this phenomenon is of limited scope, particularly in terms of mea-
suring the interaction between price uncertainty and political constraints in developing
economies. This paper seeks to fill the gap in the literature by investigating how world
commodity price uncertainty and level shocks exacerbate the risk of political conflict
in emerging economies. I build a small open-economy model of political competition
where features of the distribution of global economic shocks can influence the domes-
tic political process. Using a panel dataset of violent and nonviolent civil conflicts in
developing countries from 1960 to 2006, I present statistical evidence in support of the
model, showing that changes in both the first and second moment of the distribution of
agricultural commodity export prices can predict incidence and outbreak of intrastate
political uprisings. A positive change in the net export commodity price level makes
conflict less likely, while a positive change in commodity relative price uncertainty works
in the opposite direction. Whereas most open-economy papers focus on the welfare gains
of greater integration into the global economy, by taking a first step toward modeling
the interaction between domestic political constraints and global macroeconomic forces,
the findings of this investigation can inform policy-makers about the extent to which a
country should be insulated from international economic shocks, as well as highlight a
possible channel through which global financial market reform can influence geopolitical
stability.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I discuss some of the
literature related to the economics of conflict. In Section 1.3, I lay out a simple, two-
period small open economy model of political conflict. Section 1.4 describes the data
and presents empirical results supporting the model, and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Review of Literature
Economists and political scientists have long recognized that identifying the effect of
the economy on politics and vice-versa presents challenges due to the endogenous re-
lationship between the two. The literature seeking to deal with this challenge can be
broadly classified into three categories: econometric analyses of the effect of economic
2
variables on the likelihood of political change, econometric analyses of the effect of polit-
ical events on economic variables, and theoretical modeling of economic agents’ behavior
under political constraints.
This paper is most closely related to the literature seeking to identify the effect of eco-
nomic conditions on political processes. In an early contribution, Grier and McGarrity
present empirical evidence that per-capita income growth, inflation, and unemployment
have an influence on the electoral performance of incumbent politicians in the House
of Representatives (Grier and McGarrity 1998). In contrast to their closed-economy
approach, this paper will analyze the experience of a panel of countries in response to
global economic shocks. Miguel et al. take a similar stance, and address the endo-
geneity of economic factors used as explanatory variables for conflict incidence (Miguel,
Satyanath and Sergenti 2004). Whereas I will exploit the plausible exogeneity of world
commodity prices to a small open economy, these authors use rainfall as an instrument
for economic growth in African countries, finding that a five percent negative growth
shock increases the likelihood of civil war by nearly one-half. Bru¨ckner and Ciccone also
use commodity prices, finding that downturns in export commodity prices are associated
with increased outbreak of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bru¨ckner and Ciccone 2010).
In an IMF report, Arezki and Bru¨ckner find that changes in a global food price index
can predict conflict in developing countries, (Arezki and Bru¨ckner 2011) but none of
the papers above address the effect of uncertainty on the likelihood of civil war. A
work that does address such uncertainty effects is Elbadawi and Hegre (Elbadawi and
Hegre 2008). Elbadawi and Hegre examine the effect of terms of trade volatility on
intrastate armed conflict, finding no robust evidence for a direct effect. One flaw of
their approach may be the use of annual data; data at that level of aggregation tends
to smooth away second-moment effects and understate their importance. In this work
I will exploit data at monthly and quarterly frequencies in order to better capture the
extent of price movements faced by developing countries.
This paper is somewhat related to the literature that seeks to econometrically identify
the effect of political states on economic variables. Bittlingmayer argues that volatility in
German stock prices during the decades marking the transition from Imperial to Weimar
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Germany was primarily driven by the dramatic political shift (Bittlingmayer 1998). Un-
der this assumption, politics has a clear effect on the stock market: current and past
increases in volatility are associated with declines in output and stock prices. Abadie
and Gardeazabal exploit the terrorist activity in Spain’s Basque Country as a natural
experiment to evaluate economic costs of conflict, finding that terrorist activity caused
a 10 percent decrease in per-capita GDP relative to a synthetic control region and that
stock prices show positive relative performance after the terrorist cease-fire (Abadie
and Gardeazabal 2003). Mobarak finds a robust connection between democracy and
economic development through the volatility channel: democracy and economic diversi-
fication is associated with lower volatility of macroeconomic variables, which in turn is
associated with higher growth (Mobarak 2005). He uses Muslim countries to instrument
for democracy to address the endogeneity of political systems with levels of economic
development.
Finally, the model presented in this paper draws elements from the game-theoretic
equilibrium models of interaction between economic and political agents. Marcouiller
and Young show that a predatory government that increases taxation and graft at the
expense of a shrinking formal economy may be acting rationally, and that the optimal
level of government predation is determined by the elasticity of substitution between
the goods produced in the formal and informal sectors of the economy (Marcouiller and
Young 1995). Acemoglu and Robinson highlight the interaction between rich and poor
agents in an unequal society and its role in generating political transitions and consolida-
tion of democracy, finding that societies with higher asset inequality between citizens are
more prone to social conflict and fiscal policy volatility (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001).
Aghion et al. study the social dilemma of simultaneously desiring an effective leader
while needing to limit the power of the political authority in a model where the insula-
tion of leaders (defined as the share of votes that can block a leader’s actions ex post)
is determined endogenously (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004). The authors show that
political insulation is positively correlated with several measures of ethnic fractionaliza-
tion and polarization. In the equilibrium of Yared’s dynamic model of a rent-seeking
politician and citizens, temporary economic shocks can generate volatile and persistent
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changes in the tax rate, demonstrating that the assumption of a benevolent govern-
ment which is prevalent in the tax literature is far from benign; political distortions
can create incomplete asset market-resembling behavior in an economy with complete
markets (Yared 2010).
Though they may not necessarily tie their results to political consequences, labor
theoretic models of trade unions and industrial strikes can also motivate studies of
civil conflict. Ashenfelter and Johnson develop a model that highlights the bargaining
process between trade union leaders, union members, and firm managers in determining
the conditions under which a firm will incur a strike, the length of strikes, and the
determination of wages (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969). Espinosa and Rhee develop a
repeated game model of wage bargaining that reconciles the Pareto inefficient outcomes
of the classic monopoly union model with the efficient bargaining model (Espinosa and
Rhee 1989). In their paper, strikes can emerge as part of a punishment mechanism
when the firm deviates from an efficient, cooperative equilibrium. By recasting firm
managers as government and unions as an organized political opposition, such models
may conceivably be used to study political negotiation and failures thereof. For the
purposes of this exercise however, I will abstract from the organizational aspects of and
bargaining interactions between political agents.
In contrast to the general equilibrium models discussed in the political economy and
labor economics literature described above, the model in this paper is a very simple,
partial-equilibrium model designed to motivate the empirical exercise which follows.
Details of the model are presented in Section 1.3.
1.3 Model
The model is a simplified version of the framework in (Barro 1973) featuring a two-
period, small open economy populated by a representative citizen and a rent-seeking
dictator. In each period, the citizen receives an exogenous, deterministic endowment
m of a commodity which is subject to taxation by the dictator. After paying this tax,
the citizen exports the remainder of his endowment to the rest of the world, receiving a
final consumption good as payment. I assume that financial markets in the country are
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underdeveloped so that the citizen is unable to access vehicles for saving or borrowing
and must consume the entirety of his income after trade. The real prices of these goods
(in units of the imported consumption good) are set in the rest of the world and treated
as the realization of an exogenous stochastic process from the perspective of the agents in
the small open economy. The dictator, in the meantime, chooses a tax rate to maximize
rents in each period. If the tax rate is excessively high, the citizen is able to overthrow
the dictator, at which point a new, albeit identical, dictator comes into power and the
game is played again.
Within each period, the timing of events is as follows:
1. Citizens receive endowment m.
2. Citizens set reservation utility for complying with dictator. Dictator sets tax rate
τ .
3. Prices are realized and goods are sold.
4. Citizens either comply with dictator policy or ignite revolution. Dictator receives
rents and, if not kicked out, the value of holding office. If dictator is deposed, a
new, identical authoritarian government comes into power.
1.3.1 Information
Commodity export prices in units of consumption are determined exogenously and are
assumed to follow a log-normal distribution so that lnPt ∼ N (µ, σ), or equivalently,
Pt ∼ Λ(µ, σ). As the consumption good must be imported, the real commodity price Pt
can also be interpreted as the small open economy’s terms of trade.
1.3.2 Preferences
Prior to the realization of export prices in the first period, citizens determine their
political attitudes (i.e. willingness to tolerate a government’s rent-seeking behavior) in
a way that maximizes their expected intertemporal utility function:
E0[U1] = E0 [lnC1 + β lnC2] (1.1)
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subject to the budget constraint
Ct ≤ Pt(1− τ)m (1.2)
where t ∈ {1, 2}.
At the end of each period, citizens choose whether or not to comply with the dictator
based on whether their intertemporal utility is above a certain reservation level ωt.
Citizens only foment revolution to punish the dictator ex-post for failing to achieve
a minimum standard of living in the country; as the dictator’s possible replacement is
identical from the viewpoint of the citizens, imposing this punishment is weakly optimal.
As stated earlier, citizens set their reservation utility before export prices have been
realized. The compliance decision is given by:
pit =

0, if Ut < ωt
1, if Ut ≥ ωt
(1.3)
The dictator’s objective is to maximize rents in each period. I assume a short-sighted
dictator who does not behave intertemporally, but who nevertheless seeks to hold onto
office because of the presence of an exogenous value of being in power. The dictator’s
period utility function is:
Et [vD] = ln r + pit lnR (1.4)
where lnR reflects the exogenous utility of holding office. The dictator’s budget con-
straint equates rents to the taxed portion of citizens’ income:
r = τm (1.5)
The dictator can behave in one of two ways: he may try to stay in office forever or
impose maximum taxes and accept that he will be thrown out of power. In order to
ensure that the dictator tries to hold onto office rather than voluntarily relinquishing
power, I assume the following condition holds:
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Assumption 1.
ln r + lnR ≥ lnm ⇒ r ≥ m/R (1.6)
Because the maximum amount of rent that the dictator can extract is the citizens’
total endowment m, it is natural to further assume that R > 1, which also implies the
utility of holding power is strictly positive.
1.3.3 Equilibrium
Now, given that the dictator wants to both hold onto power and maximize rents, he
will set taxes as high as possible such that citizens will be expected to comply with his
policies rather than ignite revolution. In other words, he sets taxes so that citizens’
expected utility is arbitrarily close to their reservation level for compliance, and (1.3)
holds as an equality. Combining (1.3) with (1.1) and the distribution of world prices
yields the condition:
ω1 = (1 + β) [ln (1− τ)m+ µ] (1.7)
Applying the dictator budget constraint (1.5), it is possible to derive one of the condi-
tions for the equilibrium level of rents:
r = m− exp
(
ω1
1 + β
− µ
)
(1.8)
Citizens will want rents to be as small as possible. To that end, they will set
their reservation utility level in order to make dictator power constraint (1.6) hold with
equality.
ln r + lnR = lnm ⇒ r = m
R
(1.9)
Equations (1.8) and (1.9) will pin down the reservation utility as a function of model
parameters.
At this point, prices are realized and the citizens choose whether to comply with or
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revolt against the dictator. Citizens’ end-of-period expected intertemporal utility is:
U1 = lnP1(1− τ)m+ βE1 [lnP2(1− τ)m]
= lnP1(1− τ)m+ β [ln (1− τ)m+ µ]
= lnP1(1− τ)m+ β
[
ln (1− τ)m+ lnE1[P2]− σ22
] (1.10)
The last two lines in (1.10) follow from the properties of the log-normal distribution.
Suppose there is a permanent, positive shock to the mean of the log relative price dis-
tribution at the end of period 1, which could happen in the realistic case that the log
of prices is non-stationary. By the second line of (1.10), the citizens’ end-of-period
expected utility is increased, making it more likely the citizens will achieve their reser-
vation utility level and, consequently, comply with the dictator. Suppose in period 1,
there is a positive, mean-preserving, permanent shock to the variance of the log relative
price distribution (i.e. P is held constant). By the third line of (1.10), this shock to
uncertainty lowers utility and makes it more likely that revolution will occur. This anal-
ysis suggests that both first-moment and second-moment relative price shocks should
play a role in determining conflict in developing countries.
The second period of the model is solved in similar fashion. Realized utility at the
end of the terminal period can be expressed as: U2 = lnP2 + ln (1− τ)m. However,
as there are no expectations of future utility at the end of the period, ultimately only
negative shocks to the relative price level can send a country into conflict.
1.3.4 Comparative Statics
Using (1.8) and (1.9), the solution for the reservation level in period 1 is:
ω1 = (1 + β)
{
lnm+ ln
(
R− 1
R
)
− µ
}
(1.11)
Taking the derivative of (1.11) with respect to the level of endowment, m, yields:
∂ω1
∂m
=
1 + β
m
> 0. As citizens’ income increases (for a small enough increase such that the
dictator power-holding constraint (1.6) holds), they demand a higher level of utility in
order to comply with the dictator’s policies. For a given distribution of prices, this
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implies that richer countries are more likely to overthrow a dictator. Figure 1.1 depicts
the reservation utility level calculated for low and high values of m, superimposed on
the probability density curve for the relative price. A realization of relative price levels
lower than the expected value used in the calculation of the reservation utility can
result in political conflict. The shaded areas under the curves in Figure 1.1 represent
the probability of revolution. An increase in m increases the size of the region in which
prices are associated with conflict and therefore increases the likelihood of revolution.
(a) Lower m
(b) Higher m
Figure 1.1: Effect of increase in m
Similarly, taking the derivative of (1.11) with respect to the exogenous value of
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holding power, R, yields:
∂ω1
∂R
=
1 + β
R(R− 1) . This derivative is positive so long as
R > 1, or equivalently, so long as the dictator receives positive utility from being in
office. As the value of holding office increases, the dictator is able to request a lower
tax rate from the citizens; combining equilibrium conditions (1.5) and (1.9) shows that
the equilibrium tax rate is τ∗ = 1R . However, citizens do not see this lower tax rate as a
sign of the dictator’s beneficence. Rather, it arises in equilibrium because the citizens,
who are aware of the higher value of holding office, take the liberty to impose even more
stringent demands upon their government. This demand takes the form of a higher
reservation level of utility for not revolting, and by the same logic as before, increases
the likelihood that the dictator will be overthrown, for a given distribution of prices.
These results find some support in the data. In the graphs below, I use the 2011
Freedom in the World survey’s combined average rating of political rights and civil
liberties1 to proxy for whether or not a country has overthrown a dictator. Rating is
done on a scale from 1 to 7, with lower scores indicating higher measures of political
rights and civil liberties. Presumably, countries which have authoritarian governments
should garner a higher ranking. 2009 per-capita GDP data taken from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators is used as a measure of income. In Figure (1.2a), I drop
all countries which are classified as high-income by the World Bank in 2009.2 The model
suggests that we should observe a negative relationship between level of freedom and
income, a prediction which is borne out in the data.
Measuring the exogenous value of being in power proves to be challenging. One
reason a dictator might choose to hold power is to enjoy the geopolitical prestige offered
by international recognition and influence. I conjecture that international influence can
partly be explained by military power, especially to the extent that military clout can be
projected beyond domestic borders, and thus sophistication of a nation’s armed forces
may serve as a reasonable measure of the external utility of holding office. I use the ratio
of military expenditure to military personnel in 2007, taken from the Correlates of War
Project’s National Material Capabilities v4.0 dataset, to measure military sophistication.
1Published by Freedom House (see appendix).
2Technically, the World Bank definition categorizes countries according to threshold limits for gross
national income. Here I apply the same thresholds to gross domestic product.
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In Figure (1.2b), I drop all high-income countries in the year 2007, as categorized by
the World Bank. The model indicates that we should expect a negative relationship
between military sophistication and the measure of political freedoms, which proves to
be the case.
(a) Freedom index vs GDP
(b) Freedom index vs military expenditure
Figure 1.2: Relationship between political system & measures of income and value of
office-holding
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1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Data
The primary implication of the model in the previous section is that both level and
uncertainty shocks to commodity export price levels can generate conflict situations
within countries. To test this proposition, I construct a panel dataset of all countries
between 1960 and 2006, at the quarterly frequency. For each quarter-country pair,
I record whether or not the country has been in internal conflict as recorded by the
Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset compiled by Stephan &
Chenoweth (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This unique dataset takes into account
not only violent, armed resistance campaigns, but non-violent revolutions as well, and
considers only major events (>1,000 battle deaths in violent conflicts or >1,000 partici-
pants in nonviolent conflicts) with maximal objectives (posing a major challenge to the
existing order, producing a major government crackdown on participants or resulting in
the expulsion of a foreign occupier or domestic regime, self-determination, or secession).
The NAVCO dataset is recorded at annual frequency, so I cross-reference the conflict
dates with those listed in Gleditsch, et al. to narrow down the precise quarters of
conflict where overlap between the databases occurs (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson,
Sollenberg and Strand 2002). When no overlap occurs, I assume the country has been
experiencing conflict for the entire year. This is a reasonable assumption due to the
difficulty of identifying precise dates of conflict onset and resolution; in some cases the
two databases disagree on even the year that a conflict started or ended, indicating the
blurred distinction between whether an incident is an isolated event or part of a major
campaign. Formally, the dependent variable records conflict incidence as:
conflictt =

1, if conflict in period t
0, if no conflict in period t
(1.12)
Descriptive statistics for the conflict variable are given in Table 1.1.
To measure prices, I use international commodity price data from the World Bank
GEM Commodities database. (Bank 2011) The data used are given at monthly frequency
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
conflict 21808 0.177 0.382 0.000 1.000
Table 1.1: Summary statistics for conflict variable, quarterly frequency
from January 1960 to December 2006. I use the constant price (in year 2000 USD) series
for 21 agricultural commodities, normalizing the initial monthly observation to unity.
Quarterly means were used to measure the commodity’s price level. For price volatility
I calculate the quarterly mean of monthly standard deviations for each commodity.3 I
then construct aggregate commodity price level (PI) and volatility (VarPI or VolxPI)
indices for each country by taking a weighted sum of commodity prices or volatilities
respectively, where the weights are a country’s time-invariant net export shares of each
commodity. If a country is not a net exporter of a particular commodity, that commodity
receives a weight of zero in the country’s export price and volatility indices. For export
shares I use data on commodity imports and exports in 2006 from the United Nations
Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
A list of commodities and accompanying summary statistics at the quarterly fre-
quency appears in Table 1.2, along with summary statistics for the aggregate commodity
export price level and uncertainty indices. Vol1PI and Vol2PI are alternative uncertainty
series whose construction will be described in the robustness checks section of this pa-
per. Indices are equal to zero in countries that are not net exporters of any of the 21
commodities; in these cases the countries are dropped from the sample due to perfect
collinearity between the constant term and the constant commodity price level and un-
certainty indices. In the estimated equations that follow, level and uncertainty indices
are differenced and filtered of time effects by regressing them on a set of quarterly time
dummies.
Finally, I restrict the sample of countries in the estimation by partitioning them
into high-, middle-, and low-income countries according to the 1987 World Bank World
Development Indicators definition. High income and upper middle income countries
are dropped from the sample, as these countries are most likely to violate the small
3Monthly standard deviations are calculated as a rolling standard deviation of commodity prices
where the moving window includes the first to third lag. Results are similar when calculated for as
many as six lags of monthly price observations.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
banana 21808 0.826 0.170 0.481 1.382
barley 21808 1.058 0.214 0.532 1.872
cocoa 21808 0.830 0.434 0.332 2.681
coconut oil 21808 0.524 0.259 0.162 1.572
coffee 21808 0.885 0.519 0.184 3.556
copra 21808 0.510 0.246 0.167 1.544
groundnut oil 21808 0.768 0.252 0.364 1.679
maize 21808 0.806 0.287 0.388 1.661
beef 21808 0.980 0.301 0.487 1.956
chicken 21808 0.984 0.149 0.674 1.278
orange 21808 1.024 0.252 0.604 2.006
palm oil 21808 0.669 0.282 0.249 1.671
rice 21808 0.904 0.444 0.388 2.877
sorghum 21808 0.877 0.297 0.453 1.893
soybean meal 21808 0.753 0.301 0.355 2.540
soybean oil 21808 0.838 0.353 0.370 2.393
soybean 21808 0.875 0.306 0.485 2.391
sugar 21808 1.112 0.386 0.796 4.566
tea 21808 0.540 0.199 0.270 1.000
tobacco 21808 0.497 0.162 0.288 1.000
wheat 21808 0.771 0.260 0.414 1.944
PI 14100 0.821 0.340 0.162 4.566
VarPI 14025 0.062 0.095 0.000 1.255
Vol1PI 14025 0.017 0.068 0.000 1.576
Vol2PI 14100 0.065 0.093 0.000 1.773
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for prices and uncertainty series, quarterly frequency
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open economy assumption and for whom domestic supply and demand effects are likely
to influence global commodity prices. For the remaining 75 countries in the sample I
estimate the effect of an increase in the change of the price index and the uncertainty
index on the probability of conflict incidence. A preview of the primary result can be
seen in the cross-sectional illustration of Figure 1.3. In this figure, the average conflict
incidence is plotted against the average change in the price uncertainty index over the
1960s, with each point representing a country. The correlation coefficient is positive and
significant at 0.2512, suggesting there may be some connection between higher price
uncertainty and conflict incidence. Results for the estimation of the dynamic models
over the full sample period are shown beginning with Table 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Average conflict incidence versus average change in uncertainty, 1960s
1.4.2 Methodology and Estimation
In the following tables I present linear and nonlinear probability models which estimate
the effect of changes in price level and uncertainty on the likelihood of conflict incidence.
Incorporating changes (rather than levels) of the commodity price level and uncertainty
indices reflects the fact that the realizations of prices and uncertainty only matter for
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conflict insofar as they lower utility relative to the reservation level of utility associated
with keeping the dictator in power. The reservation utility level is, in turn, calculated
from the expected value of prices and uncertainty conditional on the information set of
the previous period. Though the model in Section 1.3 featured a stationary distribu-
tion for the mean and standard deviation of prices, it is more empirically likely that
commodity price levels and uncertainty are nonstationary.4 For example,
lnPt = lnPt−1 + σt−1ηt (1.13)
σt = σt−1 + t (1.14)
where ηt ∼ N (0, 1), t is a white-noise shock, and {P0, σ0} are given. In this case,
citizens’ expected utility prior to the realization of commodity price level and uncertainty
shocks can be written as:
E0[U1] = ω1 = lnP0 + β lnE0[P1]− βσ
2
0
2
+ (1 + β) ln {(1 + τ)m} (1.15)
Utility after the realization of prices in period 1 can be written as:
U1 = lnP1 + β lnE1[P2]− βσ
2
1
2
+ (1 + β) ln {(1 + τ)m} (1.16)
Conflict occurs when the difference between (1.16) and (1.15) is less than zero:
conflict1 =

1, if ∆ lnP1 + β (lnE1[P2]− lnE0[P1])− β2 ∆σ21 < 0
0, otherwise
(1.17)
Equation (1.17) illustrates that, ceteris paribus, negative changes in the real export price
level and positive, mean-preserving changes in price uncertainty are likely to result in
conflict. Equation (1.17) also demonstrates that the predictions of the theoretical model
can be readily assessed using a binary outcome model such as the logit or probit model,
4Heteroskedasticity-robust Hadri Lagrange multiplier tests for the stationarity of the net export
commodity price index and the three uncertainty indices used in this paper strongly reject the null
hypothesis that all panels are stationary (p < 0.0001), regardless of inclusion of time trends or removal
of cross-sectional means from the respective series.
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including changes in price level and uncertainty as regressors.
Results
LPM-RE LPM-FE LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.028+ -0.028+ -0.350+ -0.350+ -0.203+
(0.017) (0.017) (0.198) (0.198) (0.114)
∆VarPIt 0.082** 0.082** 0.952** 0.952** 0.556**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.321) (0.321) (0.194)
Constant 0.194*** 0.194*** -2.999*** -1.585***
(0.029) (0.000) (0.422) (0.214)
lnσ2u 2.221*** 0.833***
(0.232) (0.229)
N 13950 13950 13950 10230 13950
Clusters 75 75 75 55 75
Overall p 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.005
Hausman p 0.481
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.3: Effect of price level and volatility on conflict incidence
Table 1.3 shows the effect of a change in the price and volatility indices on the
likelihood of conflict for the baseline linear probability model (with both fixed and
random effects for countries), the logit model with both fixed and random effects, and
the random-effects probit model.5 Across all specifications of the model, I find that an
increase in the export price level is negatively associated with the incidence of conflict,
as predicted by the theoretical model. The price level effect is significant at the 10%
level in all specifications of the model. Strikingly, even after controlling for price levels
I not only find that price volatility remains significant, but that it appears to be a more
powerful predictor of conflict incidence than the price level effect. The price uncertainty
effect is significant at α = 0.01 in all the estimated models, and its coefficient is of
the correct sign. An increase in price volatility over the previous quarter is associated
with an increased probability of internal conflict. These findings lend support to the
conclusions of the model and stand in contrast to works which downplay the effect of
5As a Hausman test for fixed- versus random-effects does not definitively reject the assumptions of
the random effects model, I report both specifications. P = 0.4813.
18
price uncertainty on political stability.
While examining the response of conflict to changes in export price levels and uncer-
tainty in isolation may be indicative of the true direction of the effects of these variables,
the model in Section 1.3 suggests that the relevant level and uncertainty variables per-
tain to export prices relative to the price of the imported consumption good. This
suggests that the estimation in Table 1.3 should incorporate a measure of consumption
or welfare. For example, if a welfare-deteriorating decrease in export prices is offset by
a welfare-augmenting decrease in the prices of other goods in the consumption basket,
there can zero net effect on citizens’ utility and the likelihood of conflict incidence. If
the prices of the non-exported consumption goods fall enough relative to falling export
prices, so that there is a net increase in utility, the conclusions of the model may even
be reversed when looking at the data. Although the presence of such effects would ac-
tually bias the econometric results against the predictions of the model, the estimation
presented in Table 1.3 can be more tightly linked to the interpretation of export prices
as relative prices by controlling for changes in the standard of living within a country.
Additionally, both the model in Section 1.3 and the previous literature on the economics
of civil conflict allude to an important role for income in determining conflict incidence.
Formally including income fluctuations in the estimation will show that the results in
Table 1.3 are robust to incorporating this additional explanatory variable. In the tables
that follow, I augment the baseline regression with several different measures of income.
As reliable quarterly national accounts data are incomplete or unavailable for many
of the countries in my sample, I proxy for income with rainfall in the spirit of Miguel
et al.’s use of rainfall as an instrument for income shocks (Miguel et al. 2004). Data on
rainfall are from the Global Historical Climatology Network version 2-Monthly dataset.
Quarterly rainfall series are expressed in meters and are obtained for each country by
averaging rainfall levels across weather stations in each country and summing by quarter.
The results in Table 1.4 are largely similar to those in Table 1.3. When changes in rainfall
are considered as proxies for income changes, the coefficient on price volatility remains
positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on price level changes remains
negative significant at the 10% level in all specifications. Rainfall itself does not appear
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to affect the likelihood of conflict incidence.
LPM-RE LPM-FE LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.034+ -0.034+ -0.403+ -0.403+ -0.229+
(0.018) (0.018) (0.206) (0.206) (0.119)
∆VarPIt 0.088** 0.088** 0.996** 0.996** 0.570**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.336) (0.336) (0.205)
∆raint 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.018 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009)
Constant 0.198*** 0.198*** -2.873*** -1.528***
(0.031) (0.000) (0.407) (0.207)
lnσ2u 2.207*** 0.838***
(0.240) (0.238)
N 12621 12621 12621 9580 12621
Clusters 74 74 74 55 74
Overall p 0.014 0.034 0.007 0.008 0.007
Hausman p 0.259
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.4: Effect of price level, volatility, and income proxy (rainfall) on conflict incidence
The previous findings continue to hold when international reserves augment the re-
gression as a proxy for income. Data on international reserves are from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics and are measured in billions of SDR. Because gov-
ernments might adjust international reserve holdings in order to pay for the expense
of waging conflict, in the first column of Table 1.5, I instrument the current change in
international reserves with the current and two lags of changes in rainfall, following the
literature’s use of weather conditions as exogenous instruments for economic variables.
The IV specification shows that a positive change in the income proxy is associated with
a statistically insignificant decrease in the probability of conflict incidence and that after
controlling for the income proxy, changes in price level and volatility remain significant
at the 5% level. The price effects are in the direction predicted by the model. Table
1.5 reports that rainfall is a valid instrument for reserves in the test of overidentifying
restrictions.6 However, a test of the hypothesis that international reserves can be con-
sidered an exogenous regressor is unable to reject its null hypothesis. Accordingly, I
6A test of overidentifying restrictions in the linear probability model is equivalent to the Hausman
test for fixed versus random effects. Here I am unable to reject the random effects model.
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report OLS, logit and probit estimates of the effect of price levels and uncertainty on
probability of conflict while controlling for changes in international reserves. Higher re-
serves are associated with lower conflict incidence in all these models, but are significant
at the 10% level in the linear probability models only. The results for price fluctuations
are similar across all specifications and conform to the theoretical model in Section 1.3.
When international reserves holdings proxy for income, exogenous changes in commod-
ity export prices and volatility are still significantly correlated with conflict incidence
in lower income countries. Higher export prices make conflict less likely, while higher
volatility makes conflict more likely.
IV-LPM-FE LPM-RE LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆reservest -0.033 -0.005+ -0.005+ -0.057 -0.033
(0.038) (0.003) (0.002) (0.201) (0.112)
∆PIt -0.048* -0.046* -0.046* -0.563** -0.328**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.201) (0.117)
∆VarPIt 0.089* 0.078* 0.078* 0.915* 0.531*
(0.040) (0.036) (0.036) (0.386) (0.233)
Constant 0.180*** 0.209*** -1.882***
(0.031) (0.000) (0.289)
lnσ2u 1.166***
(0.310)
N 9399 10429 10429 7222 10429
Clusters 69 73 73 45 73
Overall p 0.028 0.003 0.013 0.007 0.005
Over-i.d. test p 0.267 0.281
Endog. test p 0.317
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.5: Effect of price level, volatility, and income proxy (international reserves) on
conflict incidence
An alternative to finding proxies for quarterly income data in less developed coun-
tries is to impute higher frequency data from more the complete data series available
at the annual frequency. This is what I do in Table 1.6. I construct annual income per
capita series using data on household consumption expenditure and population from
the UN. I then interpolate this series to the quarterly frequency using the proportional
Denton method described by the IMF (Bloem, Dippelsman and Maehle 2001). This
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technique constructs a time series of quarterly national accounts estimates from annual
observations by benchmarking the quarterly series as proportional to a higher frequency
indicator via least-squares minimization. For this application, quarterly GDP in the
OECD aggregate is used as the higher-frequency indicator for the interpolated data.
Under the assumption that variation in total GDP of the OECD is caused by interna-
tional macroeconomic forces that affect middle- and lower-income countries in similar
fashion, the interpolated income per capita series will be highly correlated with actual
quarterly income per capita. The Denton method imposes the constraint that the inter-
polated series must aggregate to the annual frequency totals, minimizing the risk that
inaccurately interpolated values contaminate the series to the extent that it no longer
reflects actual income per capita.
As a rough check of the accuracy of the Dentonized series, I take existing quar-
terly GDP series from the IMF International Financial Statistics, recorded in year 2000
constant prices (in national currency units), and divide by the year 2000 US dollar ex-
change rate (specified national currency units / USD). I divide by quarterly population
to compute a quarterly GDP per capita series in U.S. dollars. Quarterly population was
obtained by linearly interpolating annual population data from the UN. The coefficient
of correlation between the IMF series and the Dentonized measure of income per capita
was significant and positive (ρ = 0.7010), suggesting reasonable accuracy when using the
interpolated series. However, the IMF series had a scant 152 observations, as opposed
to 14,932 when using the interpolated measure.
Table 1.6 indicates that after controlling for the interpolated measure of income,
the uncertainty effect of commodity export prices on conflict incidence is still present.
The first column instruments for percentage change in income per capita with four
lags of rainfall shocks, but as I am unable to reject the hypothesis that the income
measure is exogenous, I also report OLS, logit, and probit results. Though price level
and income changes changes have the expected sign in all columns of Table 1.6, the
estimated coefficients are not significant. However, all the columns indicate that higher
price volatility is correlated with a higher probability of conflict incidence, an effect that
is significant at the 5% level.
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IV-LPM-FE LPM-RE LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.026 -0.022 -0.278 -0.278 -0.157
(0.019) (0.018) (0.215) (0.214) (0.125)
∆VarPIt 0.081* 0.084* 0.976* 0.974* 0.591**
(0.036) (0.033) (0.384) (0.382) (0.223)
∆incomet -0.249 -0.299 -2.425 -2.383 -1.309
(3.288) (0.208) (1.939) (1.905) (0.964)
Constant 0.227*** -2.965*** -1.645***
(0.034) (0.585) (0.319)
lnσ2u 2.777*** 1.416***
(0.343) (0.343)
N 9131 10385 10385 6576 10385
Clusters 73 75 75 48 75
Overall p 0.125 0.037 0.061 0.066 0.044
Over-i.d. test p 0.185 0.316
Endog. test p 0.490
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.6: Effect of price level, volatility, and income on conflict incidence
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Alternative Measures of Volatility
In Tables 1.7 & 1.8, I show that the econometric results obtained in the previous tables
are somewhat robust to alternative measures of price uncertainty. For each commodity-
month pair, I generate a measure of price volatility by taking a rolling variance of
monthly commodity prices, where the moving window is comprised of the first to the
third lag of the commodity price. This yields a monthly commodity price volatility index
which is then converted to the quarterly frequency by taking means. I then generate a
country-specific price uncertainty index (Vol1PI) by aggregating these commodity-level
volatility indices with the same net export weights used in the baseline results. Table
1.7 presents least-squares estimates demonstrating that changes in this index remain
positive and significant at the 10% level after controlling for changes in price level and
rainfall shocks. Furthermore, the coefficient on export price level changes is negative
and significantly associated with probability of conflict incidence at the 5% level. In
the IV specification controlling for changes in international reserves (where instruments
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were current and lagged changes in rainfall levels), an increase in the change in price
level lowers probability of conflict at the 1% level of significance, while an increase in
the change in price volatility is associated with a higher probability of conflict at the
10% level. When percentage change in income per capita is included in the regression,
the estimated effects for price level and uncertainty changes are similar. In the fourth
column of Table 1.7, the instrument set was comprised of four lags of changes in rainfall
levels; the coefficient on volatility is positive and significant at the 5% level while the
price level coefficient is negative and signficant at 10%. I also report fixed-effect logit
and random-effects probit specifications where income per capita is treated as exogenous.
The results show that all price effects are significant at the 10% level and are in the
direction predicted by the model.
LPM-RE LPM-RE IV-LPM-FE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.036* -0.043* -0.060** -0.041+ -0.404+ -0.217+
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.221) (0.128)
∆Vol1PIt 0.148+ 0.160+ 0.177+ 0.186* 1.980+ 1.035+
(0.085) (0.089) (0.107) (0.092) (0.994) (0.560)
∆raint 0.002
(0.001)
∆reservest -0.029
(0.037)
∆incomet -0.194 -2.380 -1.308
(3.328) (1.902) (0.963)
Constant 0.194*** 0.198*** -1.645***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.319)
lnσ2u 1.416***
(0.343)
N 13950 12621 9399 9131 6576 10385
Clusters 75 74 69 73 48 75
Overall p 0.077 0.074 0.039 0.133 0.086 0.096
Over-i.d. test p 0.421 0.481 0.258 0.224
Endog. test p 0.367 0.449
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.7: Estimation using price variance to measure price uncertainty
Table 1.8 presents evidence that export price uncertainty increases the probability of
civil conflict occurring when the quarterly range of prices, rather than standard deviation
or variance, is used as a measure of export price uncertainty. For each commodity-
quarter pair, I generate a measure of volatility by taking the range of the monthly
commodity prices in that quarter. The price volatility index Vol2PI is generated by
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taking a weighted sum of these quarterly range series, using the same net export weights
described in the previous section. This index remains significant at the 5% level in the
baseline model as well as the model that controls for changes in rainfall. In the third
column of Table 1.8, changes in international reserves are instrumented by two lags of
changes in rainfall. Price volatility is positive and significant at the 1% level when the
instrumental variables approach is used, as well as in the logit and probit specifications
which treat international reserves as exogenous. In all columns, the price level effect is in
the direction predicted by the model, but is only significant when changes in reserves are
included in the regression. In the IV specification of the model that controls for changes
in income per capita (instrumented by current and two lags of changes in rainfall level),
there is evidence of a positive association between price volatility and conflict incidence
at α = 0.10. Neither rainfall, reserves, nor income per capita appear to have a significant
effect on the probability of conflict incidence when price volatility is expressed as a
quarterly price range.
LOGIT-RE LOGIT-RE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE IV-LPM-FE
∆PIt -0.287 -0.352 -0.050* -0.524* -0.301* -0.021
(0.219) (0.228) (0.023) (0.216) (0.124) (0.024)
∆Vol2PIt 0.217* 0.280* 0.040** 0.308** 0.172** 0.024+
(0.103) (0.128) (0.015) (0.104) (0.061) (0.015)
∆raint 0.015
(0.015)
∆reservest -0.033 -0.057 -0.033
(0.040) (0.198) (0.110)
∆incomet 2.152
(3.031)
Constant -2.980*** -2.857*** -1.873***
(0.418) (0.401) (0.284)
lnσ2u 2.203*** 2.178*** 1.155***
(0.234) (0.239) (0.308)
N 14025 12694 9428 7245 10458 9126
Clusters 75 74 69 45 73 73
Overall p 0.117 0.172 0.041 0.017 0.014 0.380
Over-i.d. test p 0.494 0.392
Endog. test p 0.474 0.286
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.8: Estimation using price range to measure price uncertainty
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Effect on Conflict Outbreak
When using the quarterly range to measure price uncertainty, there is evidence that
volatility significantly impacts the outbreak of conflict as well as its incidence. To
measure outbreak of intrastate conflict, I define the civil conflict onset indicator variable
in quarter t as 1, if there is a conflict in t but no conflict in t − 1; 0, if there is no
conflict in quarter t; and undefined otherwise. The intuition behind the construction of
this variable is as follows: if there is no conflict within a country at time t, neither is
there outbreak of a conflict; if a country transitions from a peaceful state to a conflict
state, conflict outbreak has occurred; transitions from conflict to conflict are recorded as
undefined because it is not clear whether conflict in the latter period is a continuation
of the conflict in the previous period or the outbreak of a new (though possibly related)
conflict event. Although this new dependent variable causes some loss of observations
due to missing values, it helps to account for possible path-dependency of likelihood
of conflict. Countries which have historically undergone long episodes of civil conflict
may be more likely to be in conflict in the current quarter. The previous analysis of
conflict incidence only takes into account whether conflict is occurring in a particular
period, treating each period as the same. In contrast, the civil conflict outbreak variable
takes history into consideration by recording the emergence of new conflicts as defined
by transitions from a peaceful state to a conflict state, while remaining agnostic on
consecutive periods of conflict incidence.
In Table 1.9, I present the results of the instrumental variables and nonlinear mod-
els using the onset variable; results for OLS linear probability models are qualitatively
similar and statistically significant. I control for income changes by including a measure
of international reserves as an income proxy in the first three columns, and the propor-
tionally interpolated measure of income per capita in the fourth through sixth columns
of Table 1.9. In the first column, change in international reserves is instrumented by
current and lagged change in rainfall. In this specification, as well as in the logit and
probit models that include changes in reserves, an increase in the export price level over
the previous period causes a decrease in the likelihood of conflict outbreak while an
increase in the change in export price volatility causes an increase in the likelihood of
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conflict outbreak. The fourth column of Table 1.9 instruments for change in per capita
income with the current and three lags of changes in rainfall. The estimated coefficients
on the price level variable and the volatility variable are of the sign predicted by the
model; the level effect is significant at the 5% level and the uncertainty effect is signifi-
cant at the 10% level. As I am unable to reject exogeneity of per capita income, I also
report fixed-effects logit and random-effects probit specifications controlling for income
changes. In the fifth and sixth column, the coefficient on price changes is negative and
significant at α = 0.01 while the coefficient on the change in volatility is positive and
significant at α = 0.10. Changes in income are also significant and of the expected sign
in these two columns, lending support to the predictions of the model.
IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.032** -4.492*** -1.433*** -0.032* -3.539*** -1.175**
(0.012) (1.177) (0.393) (0.013) (0.979) (0.345)
∆Vol2PIt 0.024+ 4.104* 1.516* 0.025+ 3.438+ 1.250+
(0.013) (1.717) (0.728) (0.015) (1.782) (0.736)
∆reservest 0.027 -0.122+ -0.029
(0.140) (0.070) (0.065)
∆incomet -0.960 -6.901+ -3.713+
(1.351) (4.010) (1.953)
Constant -2.493*** -2.465***
(0.057) (0.056)
lnσ2u -3.615 -4.205
(4.636) (9.082)
N 7434 4958 8340 6986 4594 8062
Clusters 67 41 72 67 44 71
Overall p 0.066 0.000 0.005 0.105 0.002 0.001
Over-i.d. test p 0.130 0.397
Endog. test p 0.474 0.598
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.9: Effect of price uncertainty (range) on onset of conflict
Increased volatility also appears to increase the probability of civil conflict outbreak
when the standard deviation and variance are used to measure export price uncertainty.
However, the evidence is sensitive to the inclusion of the income measure: I was not
able to find evidence of a volatility effect when rainfall or reserves proxied for income,
as these income proxies were not signficantly related to probability of conflict outbreak
and inflated the standard errors of the price variables when included. Results for the IV,
logit, and probit specifications are presented in Table 1.10. Linear probability models
27
estimated with OLS yield similar results. All estimates indicate that higher export
prices are associated with significantly decreased likelihood of civil conflict outbreak,
supporting the model hypothesis. Increases in per capita income are also correlated
with less likelihood of conflict onset, and are significant at the 10% level in the logit
and probit specifications. The first three columns report estimated coefficients when
the standard deviation is used to measure price volatility. In the first column, higher
volatility is associated with a higher likelihood of civil conflict outbreak, an effect that
is significant at the 10% level. The next two columns treat percentage changes in per
capita income as exogenous and find a volatility effect that is positive and significant at
the 5% level. In the fourth column, changes in per capita income are instrumented with
current and three lags of changes in rainfall level (the same instruments are used in the
first column). The estimated coefficient on volatility is positive and significant at the
5% level. In the fixed-effect logit and random-effect probit specifications that control
for per capita income, changes in volatility continue to have a positive and significant
effect on conflict outbreak probability.
IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.031** -3.011** -0.977** -0.031** -2.994** -0.941**
(0.012) (0.943) (0.294) (0.012) (0.921) (0.299)
∆VarPIt 0.057+ 6.122* 2.220*
(0.030) (2.903) (1.113)
∆Vol1PIt 0.057* 6.128* 1.881*
(0.028) (2.465) (0.938)
∆incomet -0.973 -6.544+ -3.688+ -0.962 -6.219+ -3.616+
(1.352) (3.724) (1.904) (1.349) (3.567) (1.870)
Constant -2.463*** -2.459***
(0.056) (0.056)
lnσ2u -4.030 -4.075
(9.141) (9.151)
N 6986 4594 8062 6986 4594 8062
Clusters 67 44 71 67 44 71
Overall p 0.067 0.006 0.001 0.078 0.002 0.001
Over-i.d. test p 0.422 0.404
Endog. test p 0.579 0.599
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.10: Effect of price uncertainty (variance and s.d.) on onset of conflict
In a sense, the conflict outbreak indicator onsett lies in the middle of a spectrum
whose extremes depict opposing views of consecutive periods of civil strife. If instead
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of recoding conflict outbreak at time t as a missing value when conflictt = 1 and
conflictt−1 = 1, we had recoded outbreak as:
onset1t =

0, if conflictt = 0
1, if conflictt = 1& conflictt−1 = 0
1, if conflictt = 1& conflictt−1 = 1
(1.18)
then conflict outbreak and conflict incidence would exactly equal one another; conflict
incidence can therefore be thought of as a measure of civil conflict onset which treats
every conflict period as independent. Results from the previous section have already
presented evidence of statistically significant level and uncertainty effects for conflict
incidence.
On the other hand, conflict outbreak might also be measured as:
onset2t =

0, if conflictt = 0
1, if conflictt = 1& conflictt−1 = 0
0, if conflictt = 1& conflictt−1 = 1
. (1.19)
This measure treats all periods of conflict incidence immediately following another period
of conflict incidence as a continuation of the former, strictly capturing transitions from
states of non-conflict to conflict. Table 1.11 replicates the estimation of the models
in Table 1.10, showing the results are robust to incorporating this modified measure
of conflict outbreak as the dependent variable. Across all columns, an increase in the
change in the net export commodity price index leads to a lower likelihood of transition
from peace to conflict. This first-moment effect is significant at α = 0.01. An increase in
the change in uncertainty of net export commodity prices results in a higher likelihood
of transition from non-conflict to conflict. This second-moment effect is significant at
typical statistical significance levels.
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IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.022** -2.906** -0.954** -0.021** -2.922** -0.924**
(0.008) (0.963) (0.297) (0.008) (0.969) (0.302)
∆VarPIt 0.042+ 5.889* 2.099+
(0.023) (2.746) (1.076)
∆Vol1PIt 0.036+ 4.823** 1.726*
(0.020) (1.557) (0.824)
∆incomet -0.865 -5.548+ -2.884* -0.860 -5.519+ -2.848*
(0.991) (2.863) (1.363) (0.995) (2.823) (1.353)
Constant -2.539*** -2.536***
(0.044) (0.044)
lnσ2u -13.825*** -13.858**
(3.816) (4.226)
N 9108 6148 10385 9108 6148 10385
Clusters 73 44 75 73 44 75
Overall p 0.034 0.002 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.001
Over-i.d. test p 0.505 0.475
Endog. test p 0.406 0.416
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.11: Effect of price uncertainty (variance and s.d.) on modified onset measure
Different Index Weights
In the results above, price and volatility indices were constructed using time-invariant
weights calculated as net export shares of individual commodities from the year 2006.
The use of time-invariant weights is partly motivated by data limitations which preclude
the use of time-varying weights throughout the entire sample period. However, under
the assumption that the agricultural commodities which a developing country produces
in a given year maintain a relatively stable role in the country’s net export basket vis-
a`-vis the other agricultural commodities, the findings will remain valid. For example,
this entails that a country that is primarily a net exporter of wheat in one year does
not switch its primary net export commodity to bananas in another year of the sample
period. Nevertheless, to check whether the effect of commodity price volatility on the
incidence and outbreak of conflict is sensitive to the choice of reference year used for the
weights, I recalculate price and volatility indices using net export shares from the year
1996 to weigh the individual commodities.
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 illustrate that despite the drop in the number of countries
included in the estimation in comparison to the baseline specification, there is evidence
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for price level and uncertainty effects on both the incidence and outbreak of conflict
when using export weights from an earlier year. Table 1.12 shows a sample of results
for the effect of price uncertainty and various measures of income on conflict incidence.
Across all specifications, increases in the change in the net export commodity price index
are associated with decreased likelihood of conflict incidence, while a greater increase in
price uncertainty over the previous quarter is associated with an increased likelihood of
conflict incidence, as predicted by the model. The price level effect is only significant
when controlling for international reserves, but the uncertainty effect is significant in
all columns of Table 1.12. Results are qualitatively similar when examining conflict
outbreak, as seen in Table 1.13. The level and volatility effects are significant and of
the correct sign in all columns. The instrument sets for the IV specifications in Tables
1.12 and 1.13 are generally the same as for the corresponding specifications which use
year 2006 shares as weights, with the exception of the first column of Table 1.13, which
uses the fourth through the eighth lags of changes in rainfall to instrument for changes
in GDP per capita.
LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-RE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-RE
∆PIt -0.458 -0.459 -0.058* -0.605* -0.038 -0.401
(0.299) (0.298) (0.029) (0.271) (0.026) (0.295)
∆VarPIt 1.294** 1.295** 0.109* 1.218** 0.087+ 1.254*
(0.423) (0.421) (0.051) (0.438) (0.049) (0.505)
∆raint 0.036 0.036
(0.022) (0.022)
∆reservest -0.033 -0.074
(0.032) (0.167)
∆incomet -0.755 -2.942
(3.322) (2.910)
Constant -2.959*** -3.521*** -2.875***
(0.521) (0.677) (0.764)
lnσ2u 2.369*** 2.747*** 2.946***
(0.275) (0.341) (0.442)
N 8672 6594 6677 7567 6073 7017
Clusters 52 38 48 52 49 51
Overall p 0.026 0.028 0.130 0.024 0.255 0.067
Over-i.d. test p 0.463 0.174
Endog. test p 0.346 0.530
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.12: Price volatility and conflict incidence, using year 1996 net export shares as
weights
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IV-LPM-FE LPM-RE LPM-FE LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.035* -0.030* -0.031* -2.468** -3.356** -1.163**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.756) (0.945) (0.380)
∆Vol1PIt 0.066+ 0.060* 0.062* 3.598* 6.324* 1.934*
(0.038) (0.030) (0.031) (1.677) (2.665) (0.848)
∆incomet -1.535 -0.133 -0.124 -13.629+ -11.283 -4.609
(7.006) (0.096) (0.100) (7.756) (8.987) (3.013)
Constant 0.008*** 0.008*** -4.921*** -2.444***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.172) (0.060)
lnσ2u -12.480*** -13.837***
(3.193) (1.097)
N 4512 5338 5338 5338 3170 5338
Clusters 44 47 47 47 31 47
Overall p 0.218 0.028 0.068 0.004 0.003 0.010
Over-i.d. test p 0.168 0.290
Endog. test p 0.748
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 1.13: Price volatility and conflict onset, using year 1996 net export shares as
weights
1.5 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the effects of commodity price fluctuations
in generating political conflict in developing countries. I find that in addition to price
level shocks, increased uncertainty about future net export commodity prices is a sig-
nificant predictor of conflict incidence in developing countries. I also present evidence
that net export commodity price uncertainty affects the outbreak of conflict as well as
its incidence. These findings have several implications for development policy. The first
is that restrictions on export quantities, export licenses, subsidies or other state inter-
vention in the market that reduce the volatility of relative prices faced by citizens in a
developing country may generate a more conducive environment for a new or transition-
ing government to consolidate its role. Only a model which fully specifies the extent of
welfare loss from both political instability and the economic inefficiency entailed by these
price controls can reveal how a policymaker should optimally react to these distortions.
It may be that for a newly-formed government, an active state role in the economy is
desirable, while economic liberalization remains important for long-run growth.
A second implication is that financial market regulation in the developed world can
contribute to political stability, or the lack thereof, in less developed countries. In the
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past decade, commodity markets have become increasingly dominated by financial spec-
ulators, and the introduction of tools such as commodity index funds, high frequency
and algorithmic trading, and deregulated over-the-counter trading have substantially
increased the volatility of prices faced by food producers.7 In 2012, U.N. special rap-
porteur on the right to food Olivier De Schutter remarked, “What we are seeing now
is that these financial markets have developed massively with the arrival of these new
financial investors, who are purely interested in the short-term monetary gain and are
not really interested in the physical thing – they never actually buy the ton of wheat
or maize; they only buy a promise to buy or to sell. The result of this financialisation
of the commodities market is that the prices of the products respond increasingly to a
purely speculative logic. This explains why in very short periods of time we see prices
spiking or bubbles exploding, because prices are less and less determined by the real
match between supply and demand.” The years after the 2008 global financial crisis
have seen an increased effort to expand the government’s role in commodity markets
in order to curtail such activities, such as the “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets
Act of 2009” drafted by the U.S. Treasury Department, H.R. 4173 (the “Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009”), and provisions in the 2010 Dodd-Frank
financial reform law. The discussion in this paper suggests that the enlargement of gov-
ernment intervention in commodity markets, in addition to affecting the incentives and
behavior of financial market participants, may have an impact on the political process
of developing countries.
7Descriptive statistics of these recent changes in commodity markets and their impact on food
prices is presented in the World Development Movement report Broken Markets, available at
http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/default/files/Broken-markets.pdf.
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Appendix A
Data and Sources
Data Source
Annual per-capita GDP series World Bank, World Development
Indicators: http://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
Annual commodity import and United Nations Commodity Trade
export values Statistics Database: http://data.un.
org/Explorer.aspx?d=ComTrade
Military expenditure and Correlates of War Project: National
personnel Material Capabilities v4.0
http://correlatesofwar.org/
Monthly global commodity prices World Bank GEM Commodities
Year 2000 constant price http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/commodity-price-data
Monthly global rainfall data Global Historical Climatology Network v2
(unadjusted series), station avg. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ghcnm/v2.php
Nonviolent and Violent Conflict http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/
Outcomes (NAVCO) Dataset research-and-data/
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/
v.4-2010, 1946-2009 datasets/ucdp prio armed conflict dataset/
Rating of political rights and Freedom House: Freedom in the World
civil liberties: Combined Average Index 2011: http://www.freedomhouse.org/
Ratings - Independent Countries template.cfm?page=25& year=2011
International Reserves (measured IMF International Financial Statistics
in billions of SDR) Quarterly
Household consumption expenditure UNdata: http://data.un.org.
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Data Source
(including non-profit institutions
serving households) in constant
2005 U.S. dollars
Population UNdata: http://data.un.org.
GDP per capita: OECD total OECD Statistics
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Appendix B
Relative import prices
Although the focus of this paper has been to measure the effect of fluctuations in the
level and uncertainty of relative export prices on political conflict, the model in Section
1.3 can be easily recast to yield similar conclusions regarding relative import prices. By
rewriting the citizens’ budget constraint as: P˜tCt = (1−τ)m, where P˜t is the exogenous
price of imports in units of the exported commodity endowment, and assuming that P˜t
follows a log-normal distribution, the model can be solved in exactly the same way as
the model in the paper. Citizens’ intertemporal utility at the end of period 1 is:
U1 = log
(1−τ)m
P˜1
+ βE1
[
log (1−τ)m
P˜2
]
= log (1−τ)m
P˜1
+ β [log (1− τ)m− µ]
= log (1−τ)m
P˜1
+ β
[
log (1− τ)m+ logE1[ 1P˜2 ]−
σ2
2
] (B.1)
where the last two lines in (B.1) follow from the properties of the log-normal distribution.
Suppose there is a permanent, positive shock to the mean of the log price distribution
at the end of period 1, which could happen in the realistic case that the log of prices is
non-stationary. By the second line of (B.1), the citizens’ end-of-period expected utility
is lowered, making it more likely the citizens will not achieve their reservation utility
level and, consequently, overthrow the dictator. Suppose in period 1, there is a positive,
mean-preserving, permanent shock to the variance of the log price distribution (i.e. P˜ is
held constant). By the third line of (B.1), this shock to uncertainty also makes it more
likely that revolution will occur. This analysis suggests that both first-moment and
second-moment relative import price shocks should play a role in determining conflict
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in developing countries. The only difference relative to the model in the paper is that
when looking at relative import prices, positive rather than negative shocks to price level
lower utility and make conflict more likely to occur. The political effect of uncertainty
regarding the relative price distribution remains the same in the model in Section 1.3.
The empirical evidence for global commodity import prices affecting conflict is far
weaker than for the export side. I generate net import-share weighted commodity price
level (PIimp) and uncertainty (VarPIimp) indices following the same method described
in Section 1.4. Summary statistics given in Table B.1 indicate no obvious difference in
variation between the net import and net export weighted indices that would yield a
drastically different magnitude of precision in the estimation of the models. However,
the results shown in Table B.2 for the estimated effect of a change in the net import
share-weighted commodity price level and uncertainty index on the incidence of con-
flict give a different story. Although positive changes in commodity net import price
levels and uncertainty are associated with higher risk of civil conflict as predicted by
the model, the estimated coefficients are not significant. There is a consistent lack of
significance for the net import share-weighted indices for all the analogous specifications
of the models estimated in the Results section of this paper. The failure to find any sta-
tistically significant relationship between net import-weighted global commodity price
fluctuations and civil conflict may be due to the existence of price controls for imported
consumption goods in poorer countries. Domestic price controls can make global prices
less relevant for welfare (and, consequently, political stability) in a country. Govern-
ments of lower-income, small open economies may find it easier to impose price controls
on consumption goods than to dictate the prices for which they can sell domestically
produced commodities abroad, explaining the asymmetric results between export and
import prices on conflict. I leave a detailed investigation of this asymmetric effect as
an issue for further research and argue that the results presented in the body of the
paper still indicate that fluctuations in global commodity price levels and uncertainty
can impact political stability in developing countries.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PIimp 16544 0.836 0.280 0.184 3.556
VarPIimp 16544 0.057 0.067 0.000 1.189
Table B.1: Summary statistics for net import share weighted price and uncertainty
series, quarterly frequency
IV-LPM-FE LPM-FE LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIimp,t 0.004 0.010 0.116 0.116 0.076
(0.030) (0.027) (0.317) (0.315) (0.171)
∆VarPIimp,t 0.023 0.014 0.193 0.188 0.095
(0.061) (0.054) (0.632) (0.627) (0.344)
∆incomet -0.697 -0.299 -2.506 -2.455 -1.330
(2.322) (0.192) (1.814) (1.781) (0.910)
Constant 0.224*** -3.028*** -1.660***
(0.000) (0.532) (0.304)
lnσ2u 2.717*** 1.359***
(0.311) (0.327)
N 10226 11829 11829 7512 11829
Clusters 84 87 87 56 87
Overall p 0.667 0.231 0.297 0.304 0.277
Over-i.d. test p 0.209
Endog. test p 0.969
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table B.2: Effect of net import-weighted price level, volatility, and income on conflict
incidence
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Appendix C
Countries included in the dataset
The countries included in the dataset are:
Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cote
D’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Curacao, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indone-
sia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Dem. Rep., Kosovo, Lao PDR,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Fed. Sts., Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Islands, Pak-
istan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Samoa,
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Slo-
vak Republic, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St. Martin
(French part), St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanza-
nia, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe
Depending on data availability and estimation method, only a subset of the full
list may be incorporated into any particular regression presented in the paper. As
discussed in Section 1.4, countries listed above are included on the basis of their World
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Bank classification as low- and lower-middle income countries in 1987. This definition
encompasses countries which may not be appropriately considered small open economies
today, particularly China and India. However, it can be argued due to political factors,
these countries resembled closed economies for a large part of the sample period and
their inclusion may actually bias the results against finding a relationship between global
price fluctuations and internal political conditions. For example, in India:
Before the process of reform began in 1991, the government attempted to
close the Indian economy to the outside world. The Indian currency, the ru-
pee, was inconvertible and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign
goods reaching the market. India also operated a system of central planning
for the economy, in which firms required licenses to invest and develop....
The central pillar of the policy was import substitution, the belief that India
needed to rely on internal markets for development, not international trade
- a belief generated by a mixture of socialism and the experience of colonial
exploitation. Planning and the state, rather than markets, would determine
how much investment was needed in which sectors. (“India: the economy,”
BBC News, 3 December 1998)
The econometric results presented in the paper above are robust to the inclusion of
China and India in the sample. Table C.1 below shows a sampling of the results after
dropping China and India from the dataset.
40
LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE IV-LPM-FE PROBIT-RE IV-LPM-FE PROBIT-RE
(incidence) (incidence) (incidence) (incidence) (onset) (onset)
∆PIt -0.367+ -0.368+ -0.050* -0.321** -0.030** -0.971**
(0.207) (0.207) (0.021) (0.118) (0.011) (0.299)
∆VarPIt 0.931** 0.931** 0.082* 0.500* 0.055+ 2.223+
(0.334) (0.333) (0.040) (0.236) (0.029) (1.135)
∆raint 0.018 0.018
(0.015) (0.015)
∆reservest -0.119 0.076
(0.100) (0.068)
∆incomet -0.845 -3.708+
(1.282) (1.940)
Constant -2.968*** -1.916*** -2.472***
(0.405) (0.271) (0.057)
lnσ2u 2.144*** 1.091*** -3.981
(0.241) (0.305) (9.280)
N 12249.000 9208.000 9099.000 10128.000 6865.000 7941.000
Clusters 72.000 53.000 67.000 71.000 66.000 70.000
Overall p 0.012 0.014 0.034 0.004 0.072 0.001
Over-i.d. test p 0.741 0.493
Endog. test p 0.067 0.606
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table C.1: Price volatility and conflict likelihood, omitting China and India
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Chapter 2
New perspectives on corruption
contagion: evidence from Asia,
Latin America and the Middle
East
2.1 Introduction
Is corruption within one country affected by corruption within another? Understanding
the interactions between political-economic culture across countries can allow us to
better grasp the implications of greater global and regional integration in recent history.
Until now, few studies have examined this question in detail due to the difficulty of
measuring corruption and paucity of consistent data over an adequate time span. In
this paper, I use a panel dataset of countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle
East over a span of fifteen years to examine how domestic corruption reacts to the
culture of corruption in the region in which the country is located. Contrary to the
results of past literature, I find evidence that a reduction in regional corruption can
actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country, and vice versa. If, in an
open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that a rent-seeking government
can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the marginal benefit (from
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the perspective of the government) of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by
increasing the pool of exploitable funds. Though economists and political scientists
have emphasized the growth in trade, communications, and financial transactions across
borders as powerful agents of cultural change, my results offer an economic reason for
why national corruption will be an enduring institution in a more interconnected world.
There are several reasons that corruption could be linked across countries. Previous
studies have established a relationship between corruption and levels of foreign direct
investment in developing countries, and found that FDI flows to one country can be
affected by flows of FDI to other countries. If countries compete for FDI, strategic pres-
sures could motivate governments to reduce levels of graft in their country to become
relatively more appealing than their peers as investment destinations. Alternatively,
a country’s corruption could worsen even as corruption amongst its regional peers de-
clined if reduced regional corruption increases the incentives for a government to engage
in more graft domestically. A rent-seeking government may find that lower regional
corruption has positive externalities for domestic income: foreign investors with an im-
perfect capability to monitor idiosyncratic corruption may choose to divert more capital
to countries located in a region with lower overall corruption, or citizens who consume
traded goods may have more incentive to substitute from leisure into consumption and
labor as the corruption tax on traded goods declines. This could increase the pool of
funds that are exploitable by a rent-seeking government and provide incentive to en-
gage in more corrupt behavior even while other countries in the region engage in less.
I build a model where external corruption affects agents’ choice of labor supply and
consequently, the domestic government’s optimal rent extraction rate. The model yields
the result that corruption within countries moves in the opposite direction as external
corruption.
Anecdotal evidence of countries located in the same geographic region can be found
to support this hypothesis. Global Integrity, an international nonprofit organization
dedicated to documenting trends in corruption and governance, has released annual
studies since 2006 of the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms in various countries.
Key findings in its 2009 Global Integrity Report include Mongolia and Vietnam being
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placed on a watchlist of countries highly susceptible to corruption even as China, with
whom both countries share a border, was removed from that same list. In Eastern
Europe, Ukraine was added to the watchlist while Georgia was removed. In Sub-Saharan
Africa in 2008, Nigeria was found to have improved its anti-corruption framework from
the previous year while the efficacy of anti-corruption laws in Ethiopia, Ghana and
Kenya significantly declined.1 Although these individual case studies may suggest a
more pervasive trend, it is unclear whether they are representative of countries’ political
experiences overall. In order to see how corrupt behavior is correlated internationally, it
is necessary to harmonize economic theory with observed patterns in the data. In this
paper I will present statistical evidence for negative cross-country corruption linkage.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2.2, I discuss previous work
related to the economics of corruption; Section 2.3 presents a simple model of cross-
country corruption interaction; Section 2.4 describes the data and offers econometric
evidence supporting the key results of the model, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Review of Literature
Economists have long sought to understand why corruption arises and how incentives
might be created to attenuate the problem. In an early contribution, Rose-Ackerman
considers how market structure influences private incentives to pay bribes to procure
government contracts, finding greater scope for bribery when government is the sole
purchaser of a good in comparison to a situation where a good is also available on
the private market. Rose-Ackerman also analyzes the effectiveness of penalties on gov-
ernment officials and firms that engage in corrupt behavior, finding that under some
conditions, they may be ineffective in deterring bribery (Rose-Ackerman 1975). Shleifer
and Vishny demonstrate that corruption can be exacerbated if government agencies act
independently in extorting bribes when providing a government good. If entry into
bribe-collection is free, the total bribe can rise to infinity and no governemnt good will
be provided (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Marcouiller and Young show that a predatory
1Annual country reports and summaries of key findings from the Global Integrity Report are available
at http://www.globalintegrity.org/report.
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government that increases taxation and graft at the expense of a shrinking formal econ-
omy may be acting rationally, and that the optimal level of government predation is
determined by the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in the formal
and informal sectors of the economy (Marcouiller and Young 1995). Bliss and Di Tella
argue that the number of firms in an economy cannot be used as an exogenous measure
of competition when considering the relationship between competition and corruption,
as corruption may affect the extent of competition. When considering deeper measures
of competition, such as similarity of production costs and a tendency of lower overhead
costs relative to profits, the authors find that increases in competition may not nec-
essarily lower corruption (Bliss and Di Tella 1997). My analysis will differ from these
papers in that I consider the spillover effects of international corruption on domestic
corruption; additionally, I will consider a broader definition of corruption that includes
transactions in which one party may not be a willing participant.
My paper is more closely related to empirical work quantifying the impact of corrup-
tion. Mauro shows evidence from a cross-section of countries that higher corruption is
linked to lower investment, thereby lowering growth (Mauro 1995). Wei analyzes flows
of foreign direct investment from fourteen source countries to 45 host countries, finding
that increases in the corruption level in host governments reduce inward FDI. He also
finds that investors in the United States are not more averse to corruption than investors
in other countries despite the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Wei 2000). In a
related paper, he demonstrates that domestic crony capitalism, defined as an economic
environment where commercial disputes are resolved and resources allocated in favor of
friends and relatives of those in power, is associated with a higher external loan-to-FDI
ratio, increasing the likelihood of currency crises. Because direct investors are more
likely to be exposed to local officials and bureaucracy, higher corruption increases the
cost of equity participation and causes investors to favor debt contracts, including bank
loans, as a less risky mode of investment (Wei 2001). Javorcik and Wei use firm-level
data on FDI in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s to analyze the
impact of corruption on the choice of entry mode, as well as the volume of FDI. They
find that corruption reduces inward FDI, corroborating previous studies, and that higher
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corruption is associated with more joint ventures as local partners who are familiar with
bureaucratic procedures become more valuable. However, with sufficient technological
sophistication, foreign investors prefer wholly-owned projects to joint venture firms; the
authors find that American investors were more reluctant to form joint ventures in more
corrupt countries (Javorcik and Wei 2009).
In contrast to the previous papers which consider corruption as an independent
variable and measure its effect on other outcomes, I will consider corruption itself as the
variable of interest. Ades and Di Tella present the first empirical study of the causes of
corruption, using cross-sectional data from the 1980s and 1990s to show that countries
where firms enjoy higher rents (implying less competition between firms or ineffective
antitrust measures) tend to have higher corruption levels (Ades and Di Tella 1999). In
a similar analysis, Treisman finds that countries with Protestant traditions, histories of
British rule, more developed economies, long exposure to democracy and, less robustly,
higher imports had lower levels of corruption while countries with federal governments
tended to be more corrupt (Treisman 2000). Emerson shows a negative correlation
between corruption and the level of competition in a country, and finds evidence from
international cross-sectional data that higher levels of education and more political rights
and participation decrease corruption (Emerson 2006). These authors do not consider,
however, the effect of corruption in neighboring countries on domestic corruption.
This paper is most closely related to work that seeks to measure the contagion
effects of corruption. Sandholtz and Gray argue that higher international integration
leads to lower corruption and present evidence that greater participation in international
organizations, higher international economic integration, economic development, and
democracy reduce domestic corruption perception levels (Sandholtz and Gray 2003).
To assess the possibility that cultural similarities provide a channel for transmission
of norms related to corruption, Sandholtz and Gray also include a measure of average
perceived corruption levels in bordering countries, finding a positive correlation with
domestic perceived corruption when OECD countries are included in the sample. Goel
and Nelson use state-level U.S. data averaged over the years 1995-2004 to show that
a 10% increase in corruption in neighboring states increases the number of convictions
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due to corruption within a state by 4-11%. The authors also find some evidence tying
corruption to economic performance, noticing that federal public corruption convictions
increase with the unemployment rate and decrease with gross state product, as well as
evidence of a contagion effect for murder rates (Goel and Nelson 2007). Becker et al. use
a cross-section of 123 economies to show that a higher level of perceived corruption in
adjacent economies leads to domestic increases in perceived corruption (Becker, Egger
and Seidel 2009). Corruption spillover effects are also present when geographical distance
(rather than common borders) and common official language use are utilized to define
a particular country’s neighbors, but not when trade weights are used. In contrast to
Becker et al., I will show that considering trade-weighted measures of corruption in a
panel context lead to a reverse contagion effect.
In the next section, I present a simple model that describes a spillover relationship of
international corruption that is very different from the contagion effect which has been
depicted in the literature. The conclusions of this model will rationalize the econometric
exercise in Section 2.4.
2.3 A Simple Model
2.3.1 Model Setup
In this section I construct a simple model of international corruption interaction from a
partial equilibrium, small open economy perspective. The advantages of this model are
that it highlights an interrelationship between country-level and region-level corruption
that differs from the relationship found in past literature, and it can serve as a useful
starting point to motivate the empirical analysis in Section 2.4.
Households
Consider a small open economy ruled by a corrupt, rent-seeking government and pop-
ulated by a large number of identical households with preferences described by the
following utility function:
U(c, L) = c+ ln (1− L) (2.1)
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where c denotes consumption and L denotes labor effort. Households gain linear utility
from consumption and log utility from leisure, where households’ time endowment is
normalized to unity.
Households engage in production of a good that is not domestically consumed, but
which is valued by consumers in the rest of the region. The production technology is
F (L) = WL, where W is the marginal product of labor which I henceforth refer to as
the wage. Labor income (production) is subject to graft imposed by corrupt government
officials which operates as a tax. Income net of the corruption tax τ is used to import
the consumption good from abroad at price P ∗. Exporting countries in the rest of the
region also suffer from corruption which affects domestic consumers in the form of an
ad valorem corruption tariff. The budget constraint that faces households can thus be
written as:
(1− τ)WL ≥ (1 + τ∗)P ∗c (2.2)
Forming the Lagrangian,
L(c, L, λ) = c+ ln (1− L) + λ ((1− τ)WL− (1 + τ∗)P ∗c) (2.3)
the first-order conditions are:
1− λ(1 + τ∗)P ∗ = 0 (2.4)
− 1
1− L + λ(1− τ)W = 0 (2.5)
(1− τ)WL = (1 + τ∗)P ∗c (2.6)
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) define the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and labor as:
∂U
∂c
∂U
∂L
= −(1 + τ
∗)P ∗
(1− τ)W (2.7)
For a given level of wages and prices, as corruption in the rest of the region τ∗ increases,
fewer hours must be worked (i.e. more leisure must be consumed) in order to compen-
sate for a one-unit marginal reduction in consumption. Higher regional corruption can
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increase the effective price of imported goods as consumers are forced to pay a corrup-
tion premium. The resulting increase in disutility then causes the citizen to substitute
from consumption into leisure and earn lower income. The labor-leisure tradeoff chan-
nel generated by movements in foreign corruption can affect the decisions of domestic
officials who extract corruption rents from labor income. Equations (2.4)–(2.6) can be
combined to form the household’s labor supply equation:
L = 1− (1 + τ
∗)P ∗
(1− τ)W (2.8)
which also shows that increases in foreign corruption reduce domestic labor supply.
Government
The domestic government chooses a rate of graft τ ∈ (0, 1) to maximize its rents:
max
τ
τWL (2.9)
Substituting for L with the household labor supply function, this can be rewritten as:
max
τ
τW
(
1− (1 + τ
∗)P ∗
(1− τ)W
)
(2.10)
As the second-order condition for this optimization problem is globally satisfied,2, taking
the derivative of (2.10) with respect to τ and setting equal to zero yields two possible
solutions for the extraction rate τ that maximizes government rents:
τ =
W + [P ∗W (1 + τ∗)]
1
2
W
or τ =
W − [P ∗W (1 + τ∗)] 12
W
(2.11)
The first root is outside the range for feasible values of τ and is ignored. The domestic
government thus sets its rate of corruption as:
τ˜ = max
{
0,
W − [P ∗W (1 + τ∗)] 12
W
}
(2.12)
2The second derivative of the government objective function is
2P ∗τ(1 + τ∗)
(τ − 1)3 −
2P ∗(1 + τ∗)
(τ − 1)2 < 0.
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Equation (2.12) shows that domestic corruption is linked to consumer prices, wages (or
income), as well as corruption in the rest of the region.
The key result of this paper lies in the manner in which domestic corruption responds
to changes in corruption in the rest of the region. This can be seen by taking the
derivative of (2.12) with respect to τ∗:
∂τ˜
∂τ∗
=

0 if τ˜ = 0
−P ∗
2 [P ∗W (1 + τ∗)]
1
2
< 0 if τ˜ =
W − [P ∗W (1 + τ∗)] 12
W
(2.13)
For a small change in corruption in the rest of the region, either there is no contagion or
an increase (decrease) in regional corruption leads to a decrease (increase) in corruption
within country i. In the latter case, the reduction of corruption in the neighboring
region effectively increases the income of a citizen within a given country, enlarging
the pool of exploitable funds and giving incentive for a rent-seeking government to
engage in more extractive policies. This result contrasts with the intuition in other
papers that corruption is contagious, or that corruption in one country tends to move in
the same direction as corruption endemic to neighboring countries in the region. This
finding is also not specific to this modeling approach; Persson and Tabellini build a
two-country general equilibrium model of tax competition that features international
capital mobility and governments which maximize consumer utility. They find that the
policy response of a country to the capital taxation rate of another country is ambiguous
and dependent on the concavity of the utility function (Persson and Tabellini 1995). In
their paper they assume that the utility function is not very concave, allowing them
to draw upward sloping best-response curves, but this need not be true. If corruption
can be thought of as a type of tax rate on consumers, the same model can be used to
justify the corruption substitutability result discussed here. In Appendix D, I describe a
framework for a general equilibrium model of corruption that also exhibits this strategic
substitutability.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I evaluate the primary hypothesis from the model described above,
namely that domestic corruption is negatively related to corruption in the rest of the
region in which a country is located.
2.4.1 Data and Methodology
Data on corruption are taken from the Heritage Foundation’s ‘Freedom from corrup-
tion’ index, a component of the Index of Economic Freedom released annually since
1995. ‘Freedom from corruption’ is measured using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100
represents the maximum possible level of freedom from corruption. The index draws
upon polls of experts as well as individual surveys of members of the business community
and the local population to measure perceived corruption within a country.3 Although
perceived corruption indices are subjective and an imperfect substitute for the elusive
ideal of an objective, direct measure of corruption, Treisman notes several reasons that
make the usage of such indices informative: high correlation over time, which suggests
that there is relatively small risk of outlying inputs skewing the ratings in a particular
year; high correlation with indices of corruption compiled by other organizations using
different methodologies; and the prevalence of studies showing that perceived corruption
ratings can predict various measures of economic performance, suggesting that perceived
corruption may be as important as corruption itself (Treisman 2000). Additionally, at-
tempts to objectively measure absolute levels of corruption through alternative metrics
such as the size of bribe payments, number of mentions of corruption in the national me-
dia, or number of corruption-related court cases brought against public officials may in
fact measure other sociopolitical characteristics of the country such as extent of freedom
of the press or efficacy of legal prosecutors.
A possible concern that may emerge from the use of indices based on perception
is whether they are comparable over time. If perceptions of corruption are based on
3Further information on the methodology used in the calculation of the Heritage Foundation’s free-
dom from corruption index can be found at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/index/pdf/2011/
Index2011_Methodology.pdf. Methodology and sources for Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index, which forms the basis for the Freedom from corruption index in later years, can be
found at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail/.
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a relativistic evaluation (i.e. how corrupt a country is relative to the environment
of corruption in other countries), a numerical score in one year may have different
implications than the exact same score in another year. This might occur, for instance,
if a region or the entire world experiences a simultaneous shift in perceived corruption.
However, to the extent that all countries within a region experience a simultaneous
change (either an increase or a decrease) in perceived corruption within a certain period,
this will be captured by the inclusion of time fixed effects. In practice, high correlation
of country-level corruption indices over time make such situations unlikely (see Table
2.1). Furthermore, in the econometric exercise in the next section I demonstrate that
the presence of negative corruption spillovers is robust to several specifications of the
time fixed effects. Summary statistics for countries’ freedom from corruption indices,
partitioned by region, are presented in Table 2.1.
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Corr. with first lag
Asia 323 35.78328 23.57641 4 94 0.9702
Latin America 319 34.55486 14.78513 10 79 0.9174
Middle East 220 45.28182 24.10693 10 90 0.9613
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for freedom from corruption index by region
For each country, I generate a measure of corruption in the rest of the region in
which the country is located. As the model suggests that economic openness (via trade)
is the primary channel through which domestic income is related to regional corruption,
I construct an openness-weighted aggregate of the ‘Freedom from corruption’ indices of
each country’s regional neighbors. The weight that a country’s regional peer receives in
this index is calculated as:
ωijt =
opennessjt∑
k\{i} opennesskt
(2.14)
ωijt is the weight of country j in country i’s regional ‘Freedom from corruption’ index
at time t. In the denominator are all countries k in the region in which country i is
located, not including country i itself; as country i does not appear in its own ‘rest of
region’ index, the weights associated with the other countries sum up to unity. The
resultant index is specific to each country and can be used to measure the effect of
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aggregate perceived corruption in a country’s regional neighbors on domestic levels of
perceived corruption. For robustness, I consider several measures of openness: trade
(defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services) as a share of GDP,
exports as a share of GDP, and imports as a share of GDP. Data on these variables
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and are available until 2010.
Countries included in the sample and the region in which they are located are described
in Table 2.2. In Figures 2.1 to 2.3, I plot the country average freedom from corruption
index versus the regional average index over the sample period. The figures suggest a
negative cross-sectional correlation between a country’s perceived corruption and the
trade-weighted average of that of its regional peers.
Figure 2.1: Country average versus regional average freedom from corruption index,
1995-2010: Asia
To investigate my hypothesis, I partition the sample by region and run a fixed-effects
panel regression. The general configuration of the estimating equation will resemble:
corruptioni = β0 + β1regionidxi + ΓXi + αi + i (2.15)
corruptioni indicates the value of the ‘Freedom from corruption’ index for a country i,
while regionidxi indicates the value of the regional corruption index calculated in the
manner described above. αi is a country-specific effect which will control for variables
that move slowly over the sample period or are time-invariant such as religion, ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization, and colonial history. Xi is a vector of time-varying controls for
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Figure 2.2: Country average versus regional average freedom from corruption index,
1995-2010: Latin America
Figure 2.3: Country average versus regional average freedom from corruption index,
1995-2010: Middle East
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Region Countries/Territories Definition
Asia East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Macau, (UN 2011)
Japan, South Korea, North Korea,
Mongolia. Southeast Asia: Cambodia,
Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam. South Asia: Afghanistan
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Latin America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, (UN 2011)
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Traditional
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, definition
Lebanon, Omar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
Table 2.2: Countries/territories and corresponding geographical regions
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country i. As the model indicates that consumer prices and wages are correlated with
the level of domestic corruption (eq. (2.12)), I include the log of the consumer price
index as a control, and proxy for wages by including the log of GDP. Data on these vari-
ables are from the World Development Indicators. GDP is recorded in year 2000 U.S.
dollars while the consumer price index in each country is normalized to equal 100 in the
year 2005. Also included in each regression are time fixed effects. Because the panel is
relatively short, with at most 16 time observations for each country (corruption data be-
gins in 1995 and national accounts data ends in 2010), I employ three-year time dummy
variables in order to have a matrix of moment conditions of full rank. Given that the
corruption perception index is a composite of surveys administered over multiple years
(the Heritage Foundation Freedom from Corruption Index in 2010, for instance, uses
surveys conducted in 2007 by the Asian Development Bank and the Political and Eco-
nomic Risk Consultancy), using multiple-year time fixed effects may in fact be better
than single-year time effects in capturing possible shifts in perception that might occur
in the data.
To account for endogeneity due to the simultaneous determination of corruption,
income and consumer prices, I instrument for GDP and CPI using data on rainfall
taken from the Global Historical Climatology Network version 2 dataset, where levels
of rainfall are aggregated to the annual frequency by taking average rainfall levels from
weather stations within a country, summing across months, and logged. I supplement
the possible instrument set with global commodity prices, including aggregate food and
energy price indices, from the World Bank GEM Commodities Database. As commod-
ity prices are determined by global supply and demand forces, they are exogenous from
the perspective of any single country. Furthermore, I restrict attention to aggregate
commodity price indices (such as food, energy and mining) rather than price series for
individual commodities because a country which may have some market power by virtue
of being a large supplier or demander of a particular commodity is more likely to take
these aggregate price indices, which are comprised of multiple commodities, as exoge-
nous. Commodity prices are recorded in the GEM Commodities database in constant
year 2000 U.S. dollars at monthly frequency starting in January 1960. I aggregate to
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the annual frequency by normalizing the initial monthly price to unity, averaging across
months, and taking logs. For the sake of parsimony, rather than including all commodity
prices as instruments along with rainfall, I choose a subset of series for each region such
that the instruments appear to be uncorrelated with the error term and correlated with
the endogenous regressors. In each table, I report formal test statistics for each of these
assumptions.
The Reflection Problem
Another form of endogeneity that can emerge in the estimation of models in the form of
equation (2.15) is known in the peer-effects literature as the reflection problem, the land-
mark discussion of which was given by Manski. The reflection problem “arises when a
researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether
the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that
comprise the group.” (Manski 1993) However, because the sign, rather than the magni-
tude, of the contagion effect is the true object of interest in this paper, there are several
reasons to suggest that the reflection problem is less damaging for this investigation than
for papers seeking to precisely quantify neighborhood effects. For example, consider the
simplest case where two outcome variables are simultaneously determined:
Y1 = β1X1 + ρ12Y2 + 1 (2.16)
Y2 = β2X2 + ρ21Y1 + 2 (2.17)
Franzese and Hays show that OLS estimation of ρ is subject to simultaneity bias (Franzese
and Hays 2007):
ρ̂12 = ρ12 +
ρ21Var(1)(1− ρ21ρ12)
β22 + ρ
2
21Var(1) + Var(2)
(2.18)
Assuming that ρ12ρ21 < 1 (cross-country influence is less than 1:1, which is empirically
likely given the difficulties faced by countries in adjusting their levels of government
corruption), OLS estimates of the contagion effect from country i to country j will
have bias of the same sign as the contagion effect from country j to country i. If both
contagion effects are of the same sign, OLS estimates will be inflated in the direction
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of that sign. Positive inflation is unlikely in the results I show below, which have a
negative estimate for the coefficient on the regional variable–the presence of positive
bias would suggest that the true effect is even more negative. Negative inflation of
the case described above would occur if the true contagion effect was indeed negative,
a precondition that would reinforce the conclusions of the model of Section 2.3. If,
on the other hand, feedback is dampening, and ρ12 and ρ21 are of the opposite sign,
OLS estimates will be attenuated, biasing results against statistical significance. In the
results I present below, the contagion coefficient is robustly significant at standard levels
of statistical significance; if attenuation bias is present, it suggests the true effect is even
more important than indicated.
Furthermore, one source of endogeneity that comprises the reflection problem, en-
dogenous selection into peer groups, is absent from the context of this paper as countries
are unable to choose their geographic partners. To deal with the other sources of endo-
geneity relating to simultaneity bias, Manski points to dynamic methods as a possible
means of identifying social effects. If neighborhood effects operate on individual behav-
ior with a lag while non-social forces act contemporaneously, the precise identification
of social effects is possible. For the purposes of this paper, this entails regarding τ∗ in
Section 2.3 as predetermined. For the econometric results that follow, it must be em-
phasized that the key identifying restriction is that the true mechanism of transmission
of corruption from the regional to the country level follows a recursive structure where
lagged regional corruption affects contemporaneous domestic behavior. However, as the
discussion above suggests, the presence of some endogeneity in the data does not entirely
discredit the case being argued.
Given these considerations, the resulting estimated equation is:
corruptionit = β0 + β1regionidxit−1 + ΓXit + αi + it (2.19)
2.4.2 Results
In Table 2.3, I report results for the estimation of equation (2.19) for Asia. The first
column describes results when the index of regional corruption uses trade as percentage
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of GDP as a measure of openness, the second uses exports as percentage of GDP, and
the third employs the import-weighted regional index. Higher income levels and lower
consumer prices are significantly correlated with lower corruption in Asia at α = 0.001
and α = 0.10, respectively. The coefficient on the regional index of freedom from
corruption is significantly negative at the 1% level regardless of weighting method. An
improvement in corruption amongst a country’s neighbors leads to a deterioration in
corruption domestically, as predicted by the model in Section 2.3.
Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt 20.019*** 24.775*** 16.095***
(4.971) (5.768) (4.727)
logCPIt -11.665+ -12.019+ -11.383+
(6.639) (6.722) (6.545)
regionidxt−1 -0.537** -0.565** -0.512**
(0.175) (0.187) (0.168)
N 184 184 184
Clusters 15 15 15
Overall p 0.010 0.010 0.010
Weak insts. F 43.445 47.905 37.971
Hansen p 0.862 0.889 0.834
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lag of log rainfall level and log base metal price index.
Table 2.3: Baseline results for East and South Asian countries
Table 2.4 shows analogous results for Latin American countries. Across all three
specifications, the coefficient on income is negative. It is significant at the 10% level
when controlling for the export weighted index and at the 5% level for the import-share
weighted index, showing that in Latin America, richer countries may tend to suffer from
more corruption. Moderating the effect of GDP on corruption, the estimated consumer
price level effect is significant and positive across all three specifications. Even after
controlling for country and time fixed effects, as well as income and CPI, the coefficient
on regional corruption is significant (at α ≤ 0.05). As predicted by the model, domestic
corruption varies negatively with levels of corruption amongst regional peers.
Results for the Middle East are shown in Table 2.5. For Middle Eastern countries,
although the estimated coefficient is not statistically signficant, higher log GDP is cor-
related with greater corruption. This may reflect the fact that many Middle Eastern
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -44.047+ -36.657 -49.303*
(22.514) (24.452) (21.640)
logCPIt 22.996*** 24.914*** 20.878***
(4.904) (5.675) (4.368)
regionidxt−1 -2.275** -1.753* -2.689**
(0.831) (0.682) (0.922)
N 189 189 189
Clusters 17 17 17
Overall p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak insts. F 12.801 15.857 10.920
Hansen p 0.372 0.454 0.302
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lag of log rainfall, and current and lagged log base metal prices.
Table 2.4: Baseline results for Latin American countries
countries have state-run oil- and gas-producing industries, and higher production may
increase the capacity of the government to engage in graft. Higher prices are signficantly
correlated with greater corruption when controlling for the trade- and export-weighted
indices of regional corruption. The coefficient on the regional index of corruption is
negative and significant at α ≤ 0.05 across all specifications. Higher corruption abroad
leads to lower corruption domestically (and vice versa) in the Middle East as well as
in Asia and Latin America. Although the effect of the control variables differs across
the three regions of the world, the corruption spillover effect described in Section 2.3
emerges as robust across different methods of calculation of regional corruption, as well
as across geography.4
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
Other time fixed effects
To assess whether the results above are robust to the specification of time fixed effects,
I redo the analysis controlling for two- and five-year rather than three-year time dummy
variables. The results for Asia are in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The estimated coefficients
on income and consumer prices on corruption are sensitive to the set of time effects
included. For two-year time fixed effects, higher GDP is significantly associated with
4Results for Sub-Saharan Africa are presented in Appendix E.
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -23.712 -24.438 -21.799
(43.541) (44.736) (42.298)
logCPIt -36.754* -38.859* -29.503
(18.087) (16.989) (19.976)
regionidxt−1 -0.313** -0.295* -0.316**
(0.117) (0.115) (0.110)
N 125 125 125
Clusters 10 10 10
Overall p 0.022 0.021 0.022
Weak insts. F 48.644 43.582 46.388
Hansen p 0.572 0.590 0.504
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lag of rain, current to 1st lag of log food prices, and current log base
metal prices.
Table 2.5: Baseline results for Middle Eastern countries
greater freedom from corruption while higher consumer prices lead to a worsening of
corruption. For five-year time effects, the coefficients on GDP are statistically insignif-
icant while the coefficients on CPI reverse sign and are significant in two out of three
specifications. Despite these changes, the estimated coefficient on the regional index of
corruption remains negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the primary
finding in the previous section regarding negative corruption spillovers is robust to al-
ternative methods of deseasonalization, although the same cannot be said for inferences
about the effect of income and prices on domestic corruption.
Results for Latin America are in Tables 2.8 and 2.9, while results for the Middle East
are in Tables 2.10 and 2.11, respectively. Both tables indicate a negative effect of regional
corruption on domestic corruption, supporting the hypothesis of negative spillover of
corruption. The estimated coefficient on the corruption index is statistically significant
in both regions and for both specifications of the time effect. That an improvement in
foreign corruption can increase incentives for domestic governments to engage in graft
suggests that strong enforcement mechanisms are necessary when addressing corruption
in an internationally cooperative regime. Lacking such mechanisms, cooperative efforts
to reduce corruption may achieve little success.
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt 54.991** 57.082** 50.864**
(18.861) (20.226) (18.241)
logCPIt -13.384* -13.359+ -12.443*
(6.458) (6.884) (6.196)
regionidxt−1 -0.491*** -0.464*** -0.508***
(0.120) (0.123) (0.124)
N 245 245 245
Clusters 18 18 18
Overall p 0.010 0.019 0.009
Weak insts. F 11.163 16.083 9.951
Hansen p 0.205 0.255 0.165
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are log base metal prices, current to 1st lag of log energy prices, and current to 2nd lag of
log food prices.
Table 2.6: Results for East and South Asian countries with 2-year time fixed effects
Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -8.350 -5.008 -11.004
(11.527) (11.747) (11.522)
logCPIt 10.946+ 8.945 12.531*
(5.691) (5.956) (5.571)
regionidxt−1 -0.252* -0.277* -0.226+
(0.120) (0.124) (0.115)
N 186 186 186
Clusters 15 15 15
Overall p 0.007 0.004 0.011
Weak insts. F 10.658 14.110 7.920
Hansen p 0.536 0.567 0.503
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are % change in rainfall, current through 2nd lag of base metal prices, and log food prices.
Table 2.7: Results for East and South Asian countries with 5-year time fixed effects
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -76.321*** -67.625*** -83.695***
(17.080) (17.220) (15.670)
logCPIt 46.778*** 45.076*** 46.625***
(9.983) (10.338) (9.101)
regionidxt−1 -1.627** -1.166* -2.113***
(0.573) (0.489) (0.616)
N 175 175 175
Clusters 17 17 17
Overall p 0.002 0.006 0.000
Weak insts. F 7.556 5.538 6.853
Hansen p 0.343 0.420 0.272
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lags of log rainfall, log food prices, and % changes in base metal prices.
Table 2.8: Results for Latin American countries with 2-year time fixed effects
Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -0.925 -5.395 1.546
(12.730) (11.582) (13.853)
logCPIt 14.635** 14.449*** 15.234**
(4.450) (4.238) (4.750)
regionidxt−1 -1.573** -1.452** -1.566**
(0.496) (0.443) (0.521)
N 189 189 189
Clusters 17 17 17
Overall p 0.002 0.001 0.002
Weak insts. F 11.383 8.387 16.018
Hansen p 0.177 0.171 0.185
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lag of log rainfall, log food prices and log base metal prices.
Table 2.9: Results for Latin American countries with 5-year time fixed effects
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -19.809 -14.337 -29.777*
(12.113) (11.353) (12.777)
logCPIt 50.666** 60.004*** 35.066*
(15.802) (16.410) (13.833)
regionidxt−1 -0.655*** -0.456*** -0.870***
(0.155) (0.119) (0.163)
N 125 125 125
Clusters 10 10 10
Overall p 0.010 0.005 0.006
Weak insts. F 34.682 12.018 31.498
Hansen p 0.308 0.309 0.274
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lags of rain, log base metal prices, and log food prices.
Table 2.10: Results for Middle Eastern countries with 2-year time fixed effects
Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt -51.930 -66.143+ -45.202+
(33.209) (38.814) (26.807)
logCPIt 9.862 11.614 8.046
(18.032) (20.712) (14.997)
regionidxt−1 -1.296*** -1.832*** -0.749***
(0.213) (0.285) (0.204)
N 125 125 125
Clusters 10 10 10
Overall p 0.000 0.000 0.006
Weak insts. F 23.448 21.676 13.733
Hansen p 0.206 0.224 0.310
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 2nd lag of rain and log base metal prices, and current to 1st lag of log food
prices.
Table 2.11: Results for Middle Eastern countries with 5-year time fixed effects
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2.5 Conclusions
Corruption has been linked to adverse consequences in economic development and the
allocation of resources in many countries throughout the world. Economists who have
examined how corruption is spread across borders describe a contagion effect whereby
domestic corruption takes on the characteristics of corruption in geographically proxi-
mate countries. This view generally leads to optimistic conclusions about the future of
corruption: as the world becomes increasingly economically and culturally integrated,
countries will have greater incentives to reduce corrupt behavior in their own business
and government practices, spurring similar change amongst their regional peers and
collectively blazing a trail toward some corruption-free steady state.
In this paper, I build a simple model and show evidence of a corruption contagion
effect that works in the opposite direction: an improvement in corruption within a
region can lead to a worsening of corruption within a single country located in that
region. I have shown that this spillover effect is robust across countries in Asia, Latin
America, and the Middle East, even while the three regions may behave differently in
response to more traditional economic determinants of corruption. My results indicate
that without effective enforcement mechanisms, efforts to address corruption through
intergovernmental cooperative regimes (such as the 1999 Anti-Corruption Initiative for
Asia-Pacific created by the Asian Development Bank and the OECD, and the 2005 UN
Convention against Corruption), may be less successful than anticipated. Corruption
may be an enduring problem for socioeconomic development as nations continue to
advance on the path of global integration.
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Appendix D
Corruption substitutability in
general equilibrium
In this appendix I build a simple, general-equilibrium model of competitive corruption
between countries, in the spirit of the classic Cournot model of industrial organization.
Consider a region of the world with n countries, each ruled by a rent-seeking gov-
ernment. Each government i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} maximizes its own utility by engaging
in graft, extracting rent from a representative citizen at the rate τi ∈ [0, 1]. Although
not essential to the analysis, I assume it is costly for the government to collect these
rents. The continuous and twice-differentiable (C2) cost function is given by ci(τi) where
c′i(τi) > 0, c
′′
i (τi) ≥ 0, and ci(0) = 0. The representative citizen in each country earns
an income of mi(T ), where m(·) is C2 and T represents corruption in the region as a
whole.
There are many ways domestic income might be related to aggregate regional cor-
ruption. If the country is an open economy and the citizen consumes traded goods,
higher regional corruption can increase the effective price of traded goods as consumers
are forced to pay a corruption premium. The resulting increase in disutility then causes
the citizen to substitute from consumption into leisure and earn lower income. I capture
this labor-leisure tradeoff channel in reduced form by imposing the condition that in-
come is decreasing in regional corruption or, equivalently, m′(T ) < 0. This relationship
might also arise if citizens’ income contains an exogenous foreign component such as
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aid, remittances, or investment that is contingent on regional corruption. For instance,
foreign investors who have an imperfect capability to monitor idiosyncratic corruption
may choose to give more to all countries located in regions that have lower corruption as
a whole. I will additionally assume that m′′(T ) < 0; this implies a diminishing marginal
impact of increased corruption on income.
A simple algebraic example of a small open economy can further highlight how this
relationship between income and corruption might arise. Assume home income m is a
composite of domestically produced goods and foreign imports, i.e. m = Aρ1A
1−ρ
2 , where
A1 are domestically produced intermediates, A2 are imported intermediate goods, and
0 < ρ < 1 is the share of domestic intermediates in the income bundle. As the home
economy is small in comparison to the rest of the region, we can abstract from its contri-
bution to the rest of the world’s income and assume that the latter is exogenously given
as m∗, which is completely produced abroad. m∗ is allocated to foreign consumption,
government graft, and exports to the home economy as follows: m∗ = C∗ + G∗ + A2.
Rents from foreign corruption are proportional to foreign income: G∗ = τ∗m∗. Using
these equations, we can rewrite home income as m = Aρ1 ((1− τ∗)m∗ − C∗))1−ρ. The
first derivative of m with respect to τ∗ is:
∂m
∂τ∗
=
−Aρ1(1− ρ)m∗
((1− τ∗)m∗ − C∗)ρ < 0. The second
derivative is
∂2m
∂τ∗2
=
−Aρ1ρ(1− ρ)m∗2
((1− τ∗)m∗ − C∗)1+ρ < 0, which satisfies the conditions above.
However, as it will not be necessary to specify a specific functional form for domestic in-
come in order to derive the main prediction of the model, the remainder of the equations
in this section refer to the more general set-up of the model.
Government i’s utility function can be written as
pii(τi, τ−i) = τimi(τi + T−i)− ci(τi) (D.1)
where T−i =
∑
j∈N\{i} τj is a measure of corruption in the rest of the region. Given the
assumptions on the income and cost functions above, there exists a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in this game.
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D.0.1 Preliminary Analysis
The first-order condition for government i’s utility maximization problem is:
∂pii
∂τi
= mi(τi + T−i) + τim′i(τi + T−i)− c′i(τi) = 0 (D.2)
Taking derivatives again, the second order condition
∂2pii
∂τ2i
= 2m′i(τi + T−i) + τim
′′
i (τi + T−i)− c′′i (τi) < 0 (D.3)
indicates global concavity of the government’s utility function. Thus, the first-order
condition characterizes the best response correspondence for government i:
βi(T−i) = {τi ∈ [0, 1] : mi(τi + T−i) + τim′i(τi + T−i)− c′i(τi) = 0} (D.4)
The best response correspondence ties domestic corruption to regional corruption as
well as domestic income.
D.0.2 Strategic substitutability
The key result of the model pertains to the interaction between corruption within a
country and the culture of corruption amongst its peers in its geographical region. Total
differentiation of the first-order condition yields:
(2m′i(τi+T−i)+τim
′′
i (τi+T−i)−c′′i (τi))dτi+(m′i(τi+T−i)+τim′′i (τi+T−i))dT−i = 0 (D.5)
or equivalently,
dτi
dT−i
=
m′i(τi + T−i) + τim
′′
i (τi + T−i)
−(2m′i(τi + T−i) + τim′′i (τi + T−i)− c′′i (τi))
< 0 (D.6)
which shows that this model exhibits the property of strategic substitutability often
assumed in industrial organization models of Cournot competition, with the assumption
of m′′(T ) < 0 serving as the analogue of the strategic substitutes assumption in the
industrial organization and international trade literature.
72
Appendix E
Results for Sub-Saharan Africa
In the following appendix, I replicate the baseline analysis of Section 2.4 for the coun-
tries of Sub-Saharan Africa, which encompasses all of Africa except for the Northern
African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. Due to data
limitations, not all Sub-Saharan African countries appear in the sample. The number of
countries appearing in the estimation varies with the instrument set. Table E.1 presents
summary statistics for the freedom from corruption index over the sample period for all
available Sub-Saharan African countries. A scatterplot of a country’s average freedom
from corruption index over the sample period versus its corresponding average trade-
weighted index of regional freedom from corruption appears in Figure E.1. As for Asia,
Latin America and the Middle East, there is a negative correlation between a country’s
average corruption index and the average for the corresponding index of its regional
peers’ corruption.
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Corr. with first lag
S.S. Africa 587 27.43271 13.11696 7 70 0.9183
Table E.1: Summary statistics for Sub-Saharan African countries’ freedom from corrup-
tion indices
For the trade- and import-weighted specification, the current through first lag of the
percentage change in rainfall, the current through third lag of log base metal prices,
and the percentage change in energy prices were used as instruments. For the regression
that included the export-weighted index, the current to first lag of percentage change
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in rainfall levels, log base metal prices, and log energy prices were used as instruments
for GDP and CPI. Qualitative results regarding a country’s response to regional cor-
ruption are similar, but instruments become much weaker, as indicated by low values
of the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. Thus, the results in this appendix are merely
suggestive of the effect described in the body of this paper and are presented here for
reference only. For Sub-Saharan Africa, higher income is significantly correlated with
greater freedom from corruption. Higher consumer prices are associated with greater
corruption, but the effect is not statistically significant. A decrease in regional corrup-
tion leads to an increase in domestic corruption as the coefficient on the regional index is
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in the trade weighted specification
and at the 5% level in the other specifications.
Figure E.1: Country average versus regional average freedom from corruption index,
1995-2010: Africa
Results are similar when controlling for two- and five-year time fixed effects rather
than three-year time fixed effects. Tables E.3 and E.4 show that higher income is
significantly correlated with lower corruption at the 5% level in all specifications. As
with the baseline results, the coefficient on the regional index is negative and statistically
significant. The same caveat regarding instrument strength applies to these results.
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt 25.277* 30.123** 26.277*
(11.913) (11.196) (12.014)
logCPIt -9.046 -2.432 -9.730
(5.945) (5.127) (6.183)
regionidxt−1 -0.469+ -0.632* -0.514*
(0.246) (0.259) (0.258)
N 290 314 290
Clusters 31 31 31
Overall p 0.072 0.015 0.047
Weak insts. F 3.615 2.536 3.459
Hansen p 0.884 0.726 0.835
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Table E.2: Baseline results for Sub-Saharan African countries
Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt 62.295*** 63.691*** 61.021***
(12.732) (13.780) (12.116)
logCPIt -6.686 -3.061 -9.030
(7.608) (6.788) (8.102)
regionidxt−1 -0.372* -0.516* -0.286*
(0.178) (0.257) (0.132)
N 314 314 314
Clusters 31 31 31
Overall p 0.000 0.001 0.000
Weak insts. F 4.760 5.033 4.422
Hansen p 0.579 0.631 0.566
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 1st lag of percentage changes in rainfall, base metal prices, and food prices.
Table E.3: Results for Sub-Saharan African countries with 2-year time fixed effects
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Trade-weighted Export-weighted Import-weighted
log gdpt 29.063** 32.608** 25.009**
(10.307) (12.150) (9.341)
logCPIt -6.645 -6.272 -7.426+
(4.326) (4.388) (4.314)
regionidxt−1 -0.641* -0.560+ -0.615*
(0.300) (0.335) (0.263)
N 349 349 349
Clusters 33 33 33
Overall p 0.056 0.083 0.044
Weak insts. F 1.631 1.513 1.825
Hansen p 0.195 0.143 0.232
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Clustered standard errors reported.
Instruments are current to 1st lag of log rainfall and log base metal prices, and current log food prices.
Table E.4: Results for Sub-Saharan African countries with 5-year time fixed effects
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Chapter 3
Democracy and Dissymmetry in
Interventionist Trade Policies
3.1 Introduction
Are less democratic governments more apt to intervene in the prices of imported goods
than exported goods? An earlier chapter of this dissertation investigated the effect
of global commodity price fluctuations on the likelihood of political conflict in lower-
income countries, which are consistently ranked below richer countries on indices of
political freedom. An increase in a net export-weighted agricultural commodity price
index was associated with less likelihood of civil conflict, while an increase in the un-
certainty of this index was associated with greater likelihood of conflict (see Table 3.1).
In comparison, fluctuations in the level and uncertainty of an analogous net import-
weighted index were not found to be statistically significant predictors of civil conflict
events (Table 3.2). The asymmetric effects of global commodity import and export
prices on domestic political conditions suggest that in this sample of countries, domestic
prices of imported commodities are less tightly linked to global prices than domestic
prices of export commodities.
In this paper I offer an explanation for why this might be the case. I focus on
a government’s choice between two alternative interventionist trade policies: import
tariffs and export subsidies. If governments have incentives to exploit their political
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LPM-RE LPM-RE IV-LPM-FE IV-LPM-FE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIt -0.036* -0.043* -0.060** -0.041+ -0.404+ -0.217+
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.221) (0.128)
∆Vol1PIt 0.148+ 0.160+ 0.177+ 0.186* 1.980+ 1.035+
(0.085) (0.089) (0.107) (0.092) (0.994) (0.560)
∆raint 0.002
(0.001)
∆reservest -0.029
(0.037)
∆incomet -0.194 -2.380 -1.308
(3.328) (1.902) (0.963)
Constant 0.194*** 0.198*** -1.645***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.319)
lnσ2u 1.416***
(0.343)
N 13950 12621 9399 9131 6576 10385
Clusters 75 74 69 73 48 75
Overall p 0.077 0.074 0.039 0.133 0.086 0.096
Over-i.d. test p 0.421 0.481 0.258 0.224
Endog. test p 0.367 0.449
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 3.1: Estimation using price variance to measure price uncertainty, net export–
weighted indices
power to extract rents from citizens, they can achieve this end by taxing imports rather
than subsidizing exports. However, if citizens are able to discipline their governments
through elections, the extent of this rent-seeking behavior can be constrained. The
greater the extent of electoral accountability in a country, the smaller its tariff rents will
be. This implies that more democratic countries will be less willing to tax imports than
authoritarian countries. Authoritarian governments in the regressions in Tables 3.1 and
3.2, using tariffs to drive a wedge between the domestic price of imported commodities
and the global price of these commodities, may explain the lack of significance in the
relationship between global commodity import prices and intrastate civil conflict, even
as a relationship exists on the export side of the economy.
I present a model that captures the economic intuition above. One feature of the
model is that it distinguishes between the level of electoral accountability of a govern-
ment to its citizens from the level of bargaining power that a government has over a
citizen lobby. Until now, this distinction has not been incorporated into a model that
determines levels of both tariffs and subsidies. While some authors argue that citizen
bargaining power reflects the openness of a political system, I show that the level of
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IV-LPM-FE LPM-FE LOGIT-RE LOGIT-FE PROBIT-RE
∆PIimp,t 0.004 0.010 0.116 0.116 0.076
(0.030) (0.027) (0.317) (0.315) (0.171)
∆VarPIimp,t 0.023 0.014 0.193 0.188 0.095
(0.061) (0.054) (0.632) (0.627) (0.344)
∆incomet -0.697 -0.299 -2.506 -2.455 -1.330
(2.322) (0.192) (1.814) (1.781) (0.910)
Constant 0.224*** -3.028*** -1.660***
(0.000) (0.532) (0.304)
lnσ2u 2.717*** 1.359***
(0.311) (0.327)
N 10226 11829 11829 7512 11829
Clusters 84 87 87 56 87
Overall p 0.667 0.231 0.297 0.304 0.277
Over-i.d. test p 0.209
Endog. test p 0.969
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 3.2: Effect of net import-weighted price level, volatility, and income on conflict
incidence
democracy and the level of citizen bargaining power can have opposite effects on the
tariff rate when tariff revenues fund both government rents and export subsidies. After
establishing the main conclusion that import tax expenditure is greater than export
subsidy expenditure in more authoritarian countries, I present some empirical evidence
in support of this conclusion, showing that the difference between import tariff and
export subsidy expenditure is correlated with standard indices of political rights and
democracy. These findings give insight into some of the challenges of establishing free
trade amongst countries with different attitudes toward democratic institutions. Given
the persistence of political institutions, these results also offer an alternative explanation
for why multilateral trade organizations such as the GATT/WTO, whose membership
consists of countries with widely different political regimes, tend to be more strict on
export subsidies than on import tariffs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a
review of a sample of literature related to the question at hand. The theoretical model
is presented in Section 3.3. Empirical findings presented in Section 3.4 lend support to
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the main conclusions of the model. Section 3.5 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Literature Review
Research into the political economy of trade is extensive, and I make no attempt in
this paper to provide a complete survey of the field. A broader survey of the existing
literature is given by (Rodrik 1995), among others. Instead, in this section I discuss a
small sample of work which is related to my investigation, and discuss the differences in
these approaches with respect to my own.
This paper is related to the literature which examines how trade policy can be
determined in a political equilibrium. Findlay and Wellisz develop a simple model of
trade where tariffs are endogenously determined through a political process (Findlay
and Wellisz 1982). In their model, landed interests who favor a tariff on food compete
with a manufacturing sector which favors free trade over the political determination of
the tariff level. The conflict of interest between the two sectors is due to the reallocation
of labor costs that would emerge as the country opens to trade: the rental cost of capital
in the manufacturing sector, which has comparative advantage, would decrease under
trade while the labor cost in the farming sector would increase. The primary finding
of their model is that tariffs that arise endogenously impose a larger welfare cost than
exogenously given tariffs, which had previously been assumed in much of the literature.
Hillman considers how governments motivated by the pursuit of political support
implement protectionist tariff policies for industries in decline (Hillman 1982). The
author adapts the Stigler–Peltzman regulatory model to a Ricardo–Viner trade setting,
finding that when authorities are motivated by political self-interest, they will not fully
offset welfare losses faced by an industry contracting due to global market pressures.
Depending on the political weight of the industry, the government may use tariff policy
to either accelerate or retard the decline in the industry, but the industry’s direction of
change is predetermined by its comparative advantage in the world market.
Yang develops a model of representative democracy where candidates for political
office have incomplete information regarding voters’ nonpolicy preferences (Yang 1995).
He shows that the framework gives rise to a probabilistic voting model where the equilib-
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rium tariff is a weighted mean of voters’ most preferred tariffs, and that the resulting in-
come distribution is more equal than under free trade. While (Findlay and Wellisz 1982),
(Hillman 1982), and (Yang 1995) abstract from nontariff policies, in this paper I will
consider how political competition can influence the relative sizes of import tariff and
export subsidy policies. Additionally, while the model in my paper will also allow for
varying levels of democracy in a country, the previous papers assume the existence of a
consolidated democracy or the government’s need for citizen support.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare develop a small-country model to show how trade agree-
ments which enforce free trade may yield higher welfare than the political equilib-
rium characterized by lobbying between interest groups and governments (Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare 1998). In their paper, a manufacturing sector will lobby with the
government for protectionist trade policy while the government maximizes a weighted
average of total welfare and lobbying contributions. The authors show that governments
may wish to commit to free trade in order to insulate themselves from domestic politi-
cal pressures, but the stronger the government, the less likely it will be to engage in a
free trade agreement, due to a greater ability to extract higher rents from the political
process. While Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare’s model features a single industrial sector
lobbying for only one kind of protectionist trade policy, my paper will allow both import
tariffs and export subsidies to exist simultaneously.
In a later paper, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare describe a novel model that pins down
optimal levels of import tariffs and export subsidies in trade agreements (Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare 2005). They augment a standard trade model by allowing incomplete
trade agreements where agreements can specify tariff and subsidy ceilings, rather than
exact levels, and by allowing for both ex-ante bargaining over trade policy ceilings and
ex-post bargaining over levels of protectionism subject to the constraint of the ceiling.
A key parameter in their paper reflects the strength of ex-ante bargaining relative to
ex-post bargaining. Weaker ex-ante bargaining implies that it is preferable to set policy
ceilings rather than exact policy commitments, and allows optimal levels of protectionist
policies to be determined.
Potipiti directly addresses the issue of uneven implementation of trade policy in a
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manner that is biased against trade (i.e. favoring import tariffs rather than export sub-
sidies) for countries that are members of the WTO (Potipiti 2012). The author develops
a small open economy model with two completely separable sectors, one engaging in the
production of an import-competing good and the other producing an export good. Both
sectors can lobby the government for trade protection, while the government maximizes
a weighted sum of social welfare and political contributions. If capital investment in the
import-competing sector is sunk and transportation costs are decreasing, there will be
growth in the export sector but not the import sector. Entry in the export sector will
reduce the amount of rents the government can obtain from subsidizing exports. Sunk
capital in the import sector allows the rate of return on protection to increase without
attracting new entrants. In Potipiti’s model, if the government has sufficient bargaining
power relative to the lobbies then an optimal international trade agreement will allow
tariffs but prohibit subsidies.
In contrast to (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998), (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2005)
and (Potipiti 2012), my model will distinguish between lobbying power and electoral
accountability. For example, a democratic government can have high levels of electoral
accountability in that citizens are able to re-elect new administrations when previous
policies fail to achieve expectations; at the same time, authorities may also be highly
indebted to special interests and elite groups. However, a dictatorship where citizens
are forced to acquiesce to policies enacted by the government without the ability to
exercise a political role can also be dependent on the support of special interest groups.
Conversely, it may also be the case that a democracy can be less susceptible to special
interests as voters punish the government for favoring a privileged few over the interest
of the many, while the institutions of authoritarianism may insulate a government from
pressure by lobbying groups. My model explicitly takes into account the level of electoral
accountability in the country and distinguishes it from the level of bargaining power and
influence of special interests.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature which tries to explain the dif-
ference in the implementation of trade policies across countries. Anderson constructs
and calibrates a computable general equilibrium model of trade between a representa-
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tive rich and poor country to explain why poor countries protect their industrial sectors
at the expense of larger agricultural sectors while rich countries favor protecting their
farming industries (Anderson 1995). In Anderson’s model, when agricultural prices rise,
wages and the price of nontradables show a large increase in the poor economy than in
the rich economy. Under the assumption of short-run factor immobility, the increase in
wages attenuates the rise in factor rewards in the agricultural sector and amplifies the
reduction in factor rewards in the industrial sector. Price supports thus have a smaller
growth effect in the agricultural sector and a more deleterious effect in the industrial
sector in rich than poor countries, which explains why they are far less prevalent than
protectionist policies targeted toward the infant industrial sector. In comparison, the
empirical results shown in this paper are the result of an econometric analysis rather
than a calibration exercise.
Mansfield and Busch examine how various political variables relate to the incidence of
nontariff barrier across countries (Mansfield and Busch 1995). Their focus is on nontariff
barriers applied to imports, such as import quotas, levies, and trade restraints under
the Multifibre Arrangement. Their analysis finds a relationship between macroeconomic
fluctuations, particularly as captured by unemployment and exchange rate fluctuations,
and levels of protectionist policy. They also find that nontariff barriers are higher in
states where policymakers are most insulated from interest-group pressures. Unlike
Mansfield and Busch, I study how political institutions affect the disparity between
alternative trade policies. Additionally, I offer a theoretical model which lends some
guidance on factors which might influence these policies, while Mansfield and Busch’s
analysis is loosely based on a review of the political science and political economy liter-
ature.
The choice between alternative modes of trade protectionism is addressed in a dif-
ferent manner by (Bown 2004). Bown analyzes trade disputes under the GATT regime
from 1947 to 1994, distinguishing between episodes where protectionist tariffs were im-
plemented legally (i.e. authorized under the GATT/WTO safeguards provisions) or
illegally (without GATT notification). The author finds evidence that illegal policies
are more likely when the country being targeted by the protectionist policy has import-
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competing industries that are highly protected through non-tariff barriers, when the
target country receives few of the protectionist-implementing country’s exports, and
when the protectionist-implementing country’s protected sector has low pre-existing
levels of trade protection. Legal protection is more likely to be employed when the
protectionist-implementing country needs to shield itself from retaliation by the target
country in a trade dispute. In contrast to Bown’s approach which divides trade policy
into legal versus illegal adjustments of GATT/WTO tariff bindings, this investigation is
primarily interested in differences between tariff and subsidy volumes across countries,
and the political determinants thereof.
Within the empirical literature, this paper most closely fits amongst those studies
that directly analyze the impact of democracy on trade policies. Kono gives evidence
that democracy leads to lower tariffs, higher core nontariff barriers, and much higher
quality nontariff barriers (Kono 2006). He argues that this result is due to less trans-
parency in the welfare effects of nontariff barriers versus tariffs. While democracy gener-
ally increases policy transparency in a country, it can also lead policymakers to substitute
from more transparent trade barriers to less transparent ones. In a later paper, Kono
finds empirical evidence that democratization can cause a country to adopt more liberal
trade policies toward richer countries but not poorer ones (Kono 2008). His findings can
be rationalized by a standard Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek model where democracy shifts
political influence from capital to labor. In this framework, labor would benefit from
lower tariffs on capital-intensive goods produced by rich countries and higher tariffs on
labor-intensive goods produced by poor countries. In comparison to the papers by Kono,
I offer a theoretical model and place more emphasis on export subsidy policies.
The next section describes a simple model of political interaction between citizens
and the government in an open economy. The model highlights how political variables,
in particular the levels of electoral accountability of governments and bargaining power
of citizens, can affect expenditure on export subsidies and import tariff revenues.
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3.3 Model
The model in this paper features a small open economy in which prices of imports and
exports are determined in the rest of the world and are treated as exogenous from the
perspective of domestic agents. The economy is populated by a large number of identical
voters on the continuum [0, 1], as well as a policymaker. Voters and policymakers engage
in a political game over fiscal and protectionist policy. Money is introduced through
a cash-in-advance constraint that requires citizens to conduct transactions in foreign
currency; money also appears in the utility function of the government. Adopting the
small open-economy framework implies an abstraction from the strategic use of trade
policy between countries, instead emphasizing the interrelationship between trade policy
and domestic political institutions.1
The game consists of the following process of events:
1. The state of the world, which is comprised of the world prices for the import and
export good ([P ∗F , P
∗
H ], respectively) and the citizens’ commodity endowment YH ,
is revealed.
2. The policy vector, comprised of export subsidies and income taxes (s, τ), is deter-
mined in a two-stage political game. In the first stage, citizens appoint a lobbyist
to negotiate with the government over the size of the export subsidy. In the second
stage, voters and the government play a political game whereby the citizens set
a reservation level of utility for supporting the government, while the government
simultaneously chooses a tax rate to impose on the citizens.
3. Citizens engage in trade while the government implements the announced policies.
4. Elections are held where the voters choose between the incumbent policymaker
and an identical opponent.
5. Election results are respected with probability pi ∈ [0, 1].
1In a general-equilibrium model with strategic international trade policy, the welfare effects of export
subsidies would depend on the nature of competition between countries. (Brander and Spencer 1985)
show that a subsidy to exports raises the home country’s welfare under Cournot duopoly, while (Eaton
and Grossman 1986) prove that under Bertrand duopoly, a tax on exports would increase the welfare of
the home country.
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3.3.1 Citizen behavior
The utility of the representative citizen is:
U(CF ) = CF (3.1)
Citizens are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint that requires them to use money
(denominated in foreign currency) to buy consumption goods. Foreign currency is ob-
tained by exporting their commodity endowment to the rest of the world:
(P ∗H + s)YH = M (3.2)
where P ∗H is the price of the export good and s is the specific subsidy, in units of foreign
currency.
Citizens’ export profits are subject to taxation by the government at rate τ ∈ [0, 1].
The after-tax export profits of the citizen are used to purchase the imported consumption
good:
P ∗FCF = (1− τ)M (3.3)
where P ∗F is the price of the import good in units of foreign currency.
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) give the citizens’ budget constraint as:
(P ∗H + s)YH =
P ∗F
(1− τ)CF (3.4)
Citizens have a limited ability to punish their governments for failing to guarantee
them a minimum standard of living ω. If citizens’ utility does not achieve this threshold
level, they will withdraw support from the government and, conditional on the country’s
electoral results being respected, replace the incumbent policymaker with an identical
opponent. The only incentive of citizens to change their government is to punish the
incumbent. Given that the incumbent’s political opponent is identical, this punishment
mechanism is weakly optimal to non-punishment of the regime. Let the citizens’ political
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support decision be represented by the dummy variable pI .
pI =

0 if U(CF ) < ω
1 if U(CF ) ≥ ω
(3.5)
3.3.2 Government behavior
The expected utility of the government is:
E[vD] = pi (r + pIR) + (1− pi) (r +R)− sYH (3.6)
Election results are respected with probability pi ∈ [0, 1], a measure of the strength of
democratic institutions in the country. The government derives utility from its revenues
r as well as disutility from the subsidy to exporters, which is financed through interna-
tional borrowing and must be paid back at the end of the game. If election results are
respected and the citizens choose to support the incumbent, the government will receive
a utility increase of R, an exogenous benefit of holding office. If election results are not
respected, the government will receive this utility boost regardless of the citizens’ voting
behavior.
Government revenues are equal to the citizens’ export revenue multiplied by the tax
rate.
r = τM = τ(P ∗H + s)YH (3.7)
The structure of the game implies that the government faces a choice in elections
between two options: it can judiciously choose tax policies in an attempt to remain in
power, or it can abuse its position to maximize its rents, accepting that citizens will
choose to expel it from office in the election. If the government chooses to not satisfy
its constituents, it will impose the maximum tax rate, appropriating all export sales
proceeds and behave as though voters will no longer comply. Expected utility from this
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decision is:
E[v0D] = pi (r + pIR) + (1− pi) (r +R)− sYH
= pi (M + (0)R) + (1− pi) (M +R)− sYH
= pi(P ∗H + s)YH + (1− pi) ((P ∗H + s)YH +R)− sYH
= P ∗HYH + (1− pi)R
(3.8)
On the other hand, if the government aims to acquire citizen support:
E[v1D|pI = 1] = pi (r + (1)R) + (1− pi) (r +R)− sYH
= r +R− sYH
(3.9)
I assume that a policy commitment mechanism is in force in the economy, so that even if
election results are not respected, the government will implement its announced policy
vector rather than defecting and imposing the maximum tax rate.
The government will choose to acquire citizen support if:
r +R− sYH ≥ P ∗HYH + (1− pi)R
r ≥ (P ∗H + s)YH + (1− pi)R−R
r ≥ (P ∗H + s)YH − piR
(3.10)
If (3.10) does not hold, then the tariff rate does not move with political variables. 2
The interesting case occurs when the parameters of the model satisfy (3.10), which is
an assumption that will be maintained for the course of this paper.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
Determination of the subsidy
To determine the subsidy rate for the export good, the citizens select a single represen-
tative to negotiate or lobby with the government. The lobbyist’s objective is:
UL = (P
∗
H + s)
φL (3.11)
2If τ = 1, the implied tariff is infinite.
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which is increasing in the size of the subsidy.
In negotiations, the government’s objective is decreasing in the size of the subsidy.
UG = (ν − s)φG (3.12)
φL, φG ≥ 0 are parameters which measure the relative bargaining powers of the lobby-
ist and the government in negotiations, respectively. The punishment utilities for not
reaching an agreement are (0, 0), giving incentive for both parties to reach an agree-
ment. ν is the highest possible subsidy rate that the government will consider. In (3.2),
it is assumed that the government can engage in short-term borrowing to finance the
export subsidy. Borrowing occurs under the constraint that all borrowing is paid back
to foreign creditors at the end of the game, which is incorporated into the government’s
utility function (3.6). Thus, ν can be thought of as a credit constraint parameter a` la
(Kiyotaki and Moore 1997); in this case, the parameter measures the total amount of
foreign currency the government can borrow per unit of export good. In negotiations,
the government would prefer not to borrow the maximum amount (i.e. so that the credit
constraint binds), due to a desire to maintain precautionary savings for counteracting
adverse macroeconomic fluctuations.
The lobbyist and the government engage in a Nash bargaining game. The Nash
product N is:
N = (P ∗H + s)φL(ν − s)φG (3.13)
The first-order condition for maximization of the expression in (3.13) is:
dN
ds
= φL(P
∗
H + s)
φL−1(ν − s)φG − φG(P ∗H + s)φL(ν − s)φG−1 = 0 (3.14)
Solving for s in (3.14) yields the equilibrium level of subsidies:
s =
φLν − φGP ∗H
φL + φG
(3.15)
s is a function of the constant parameters of the model. In order to ensure that s
is in fact a subsidy and not a tariff, it is assumed that φLν − φGP ∗H ≥ 0. (3.15) shows
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that, ceteris paribus, the greater the bargaining power of the lobbyist φL, the closer the
equilibrium subsidy will be to the borrowing constraint. The greater the bargaining
power of the government φG (keeping φL constant), the less it will choose to borrow.
Determination of the tax rate
While the lobbying process determines the export subsidy implemented by the govern-
ment, the income tax rate and implied import tariff rate are pinned down by the electoral
accountability mechanism. Because the government wishes to remain in power, it will
set tax rates as high as possible so that citizens will still achieve their reservation level
of utility for compliance with the government.
CF = ω
(1− τ) (P ∗H+s)P ∗F YH = ω
(P ∗H+s)
P ∗F
YH − rP ∗F = ω
⇒
r = (P ∗H + s)YH − P ∗Fω
(3.16)
Citizens, on the other hand, want tax rates (and, by extension, the government’s
rents) to be as low as possible. They will set their reservation level of utility so that the
government’s power-holding constraint (3.10) holds with equality:
r = (P ∗H + s)YH − piR (3.17)
(3.16) and (3.17) pin down the reservation level for citizen compliance with the
government as:
ω =
piR
P ∗F
(3.18)
This shows that in more democratic countries (higher pi), citizens are better able to
demand a higher minimum standard of living from their government.
Combining (3.7) and (3.17) gives the equilibrium tax rate:
τ∗ = 1− piR
(P ∗H + s)YH
(3.19)
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In the equilibrium of the model, the incumbent policymaker will always be re-elected,
and thus will stay in office whether or not election results are respected. In the equilib-
rium, the government will receive the utility v∗D = r
∗ + R − sYH = P ∗HYH + (1 − pi)R.
Combining (3.16) and (3.18) shows that citizens will receive utility U = piRP ∗F
.
3.3.4 Tariff levels and democracy
Note from (3.3) that by taxing income, the government chooses the effective price of
imports faced by citizens, where the effective price is
P ∗F
(1−τ) . As P
∗
F is the price of the
imported good, choosing a tax rate is equivalent to choosing an import tariff. The
implied ad valorem tariff rate t can be solved for as:
(1 + t)P ∗F =
P ∗F
(1−τ)
→ t = τ1−τ
(3.20)
where dtdτ =
1
(1−τ)2 > 0, so an increase in the tax rate can be thought of an as increase
in the tariff.
Taking the derivative of (3.19) with respect to the level of democracy pi gives dτ
∗
dpi =
−R
(P ∗H+s)YH
< 0. As the level of democracy increases, tariffs decrease. The model suggests
that more democratic countries will have smaller levels of tariffs relative to subsidies,
and that dictatorships will exploit the lack of political freedom in their countries to
extract higher import tariff revenues relative to subsidy expenditures.
Democracy vs the bargaining power of citizens
The model also highlights the difference between the effect of the level of democracy in a
country and the relative bargaining power between the government and the export lobby
on trade policy. In the literature on the political economy of trade, these two effects
are sometimes confounded in a single parameter which in reality only reflects bargaining
power. For example, in (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998), the authors “do not attempt
to model the factors affecting government’s bargaining position, but...have in mind that
such a position may be weaker in countries with more open political systems.” (p. 577)
In contrast, consider the effect of an increase in citizens’ relative bargaining power
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on the equilibrium tariff in the present model. An increase in the export lobby’s bar-
gaining power φL will increase the size of the equilibrium export subsidy; from (3.15),
ds
dφL
=
φG(ν+P
∗
H)
(φL+φG)2
> 0. In turn, an increase in the size of the export subsidy will lead to an
increase in the tax rate (and by extension, import tariffs), as the government must ex-
tract more rents to finance the subsidy: from (3.19), dτ
∗
ds =
piRYH
[(P ∗H+s)YH ]2
> 0. Thus there
is a direct relationship between the citizens’ bargaining power vis–a`–vis the government
and the prevailing level of import tariffs. However, as discussed above, an increase in the
level of democracy pi will be associated with a decrease in the size of the import tariff
in equilibrium: from (3.19), dτ
∗
dpi < 0. This result emphasizes that bargaining power and
political accountability can have distinct effects on interventionist trade policy.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
An implication of the model presented in the previous section is that more democratic
countries will have a lower rate of expenditure on import tariffs to export subsidies. Does
this prediction appear to hold true in the data? In this section I present some empirical
evidence for a systematic relationship between the strength of democratic institutions
and differences in the implementation of tariffs and subsidies.
3.4.1 Data
To measure the strength of democratic institutions in countries, I rely on two indices of
political freedom: the 2013 Freedom in the World Index published by Freedom House and
the Polity2 Score from the Polity IV dataset. The FIW index is based on a yearly survey
of regional experts and scholars regarding political rights (electoral process, political
pluralism, and government functioning) and civil liberties (freedom of expression and
belief, associational/organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual
rights). The index, which assigns each country a score from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free)
has been published annually since 1972. The Polity Score covers all independent states
from 1800-2011 and is “also the most closely scrutinized data series on political issues
as analysts and experts in academia, policy, and the intelligence community regularly
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examine and often challenge Polity codings.”3 Each country is evaluated on the basis of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition and
is assigned a score from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
Figure 3.1: Dispersion of difference between import tariff and export subsidy expendi-
ture.
Data on tariffs is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
where revenue on customs and import duties in current local currency units is available
at the country level for each year from 1960–2012. I convert all values into U.S. dollar
amounts by dividing by the dollar exchange rate (also available from the WDI). Data
on export subsidies is taken from the WTO; I use the series on WTO members’ ex-
port subsidy commitments by product and tariff line, aggregating bound values across
products and converting the sum to U.S. dollar amounts. Data on export subsidy com-
mitments is not available for each country, and I leave missing values as missing rather
than assuming countries impose zero subsidies when data is unavailable. Although sub-
sidy commitments are in actuality an upper bound which may not be the actual export
subsidy that is applied, this series can nevertheless be regarded as a proxy for the true
value of export subsidy expenditure in the reporting country. Data on real GDP per
capita in year 2000 U.S. dollars, fertility rates, export value indices, and the trade share
(sum of exports and imports) of GDP are from the World Development Indicators. An-
nual data on country-level export price indices are from the IMF International Financial
Statistics. Summary statistics for each variable are in Table 3.3.
3From Polity IV project website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tariffs minus subsidies 136 -5775.82 6645.23 -15206.74 5551.99
findex 6884 3.75 2.05 1.00 7.00
polity2 7104 0.65 7.48 -10.00 10.00
Log GDP per capita 9462 7.67 1.58 4.00 11.59
Export value index 5313 142.65 175.88 0.29 3951.42
Export price index 954 67.78 41.54 0.12 179.55
Military sophistication 3523 9.17 1.48 4.08 13.37
fertility 10947 4.12 1.99 0.85 9.22
Trade share of GDP 8895 73.77 47.81 0.31 460.47
Import share of GDP 8896 39.40 25.33 -17.14 221.51
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for data
3.4.2 Empirical evidence
Variables polity2 findex imp duties subsidy dutydiff
polity2 1.000
findex -0.892 1.000
imp duties -0.051 0.036 1.000
subsidy 0.290 -0.427 -0.494 1.000
dutydiff -0.364 0.567 0.614 -0.990 1.000
Table 3.4: Cross-correlation table
Table 3.4 displays unconditional correlations between the political indices (polity2,
findex ) and import tariff (imp duties) and export subsidy (subsidy) variables, where
difference is the difference between revenue collected from import tariffs and a country’s
export subsidy commitments. There is a high correlation between the two indices of
democracy; the correlation is negative due to the way each index is defined. The cor-
relation between the democracy indices and revenue from customs and import duties
indicates that more democratic countries collect smaller levels of tariffs, as predicted
by the model. Examining the unconditional correlation between the democracy indices
and the difference between tariff revenues and subsidy expenditures shows that more
democratic countries impose smaller levels of import tariffs relative to export subsidies.
Table 3.5 shows results from an OLS panel regression of the difference between tariff
and subsidy expenditure on the democracy indices, partialling off the contribution of
time fixed effects and country fixed effects. Following much of the empirical literature
94
on the effects of democracy on trade, I treat the democracy index as an exogenous
independent variable in these regressions. Csorda´s and Ludwig find no evidence of
causality in the reverse direction: a country’s openness to trade is not a determinant
of its level of democracy (Csorda´s and Ludwig 2011). Across all columns of Table 3.5,
the estimated coefficient is what the model would predict: more democratic countries
spend less on tariffs than subsidies. Allowing the country effect to be correlated with
the democracy index does not change the direction of this correlation, although the
estimated coefficient of the Freedom House index is not significant in the fixed-effect
model (REG4).
REG1 REG2 REG3 REG4
polity2 -186.67*** -120.03*
(70.92) (60.21)
findex 1148.83* 706.61
(673.75) (667.97)
Observations 133 133 136 136
R-squared 0.34 0.27 0.54 0.44
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Random Fixed Random Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.5: Panel regression with only democracy index
Although Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are indicative of some relationship between political
freedom and variation in expenditure on tariffs and subsidies across countries, it would
be preferable to see whether this relationship is robust to the inclusion of some country-
specific time-varying controls. In the remainder of this section, I augment the baseline
specification in Table 3.5 incrementally, leading to the final regression specification in
Table 3.12. Equations (3.15) and (3.19) offer some guidance on possible controlling
variables, indicating that import tariff and export subsidy rates are dependent on:
1. Level of income YH
2. Price of export good P ∗H
3. Exogenous value of holding office R
4. Credit constraint parameter ν
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5. Relative bargaining power of lobbies and government φL, φG
Under the assumption that items 3 through 5 in the above list are constant over the
sample period, they will be captured in the country effects. The basic OLS regression
is augmented with series on each country’s income per capita and export value index
in Table 3.6. Controlling for these series does not change the qualitative implications
regarding the relationship between political institutions and trade policies. More author-
itarian governments appear more likely to employ import tariff measures than export
subsidies. While export value indices are not equivalent to export price indices because
they reflect changes in both the prices and composition of exports, they are nevertheless
used as surrogates for price indices by many countries.4 As a robustness check, Table
3.7 controls for the export price index series maintained by the IMF. Although there
is a large drop in the number of observations available, the conditional correlations are
qualitatively similar.
REG5 REG6 REG7 REG8
polity2 -178.49*** -129.89***
(67.64) (40.89)
findex 1188.21* 1013.30***
(662.12) (301.98)
Log GDP per capita 11.55 11620.93*** 1090.45 13084.39***
(975.74) (1663.20) (843.74) (2008.55)
Export value index -17.01 -30.40*** -15.01 -29.75***
(14.15) (9.28) (13.40) (8.74)
N 133 133 136 136
R-squared 0.35 0.06 0.47 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Random Fixed Random Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.6: Panel OLS augmented with income and export value index
To address possible bias in the estimate on the coefficient of the democracy index
due to endogeneity between the dependent variable and the additional control variables,
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present analogous results to Tables 3.6 and 3.7, instrumenting for
the log of GDP per capita and the export value index or export price index. The first
4http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/tegeipi/ch2.pdf.
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REG9 REG10 REG11 REG12
polity2 -1787.30*** -1464.58***
(124.41) (56.47)
findex 3770.04*** 3585.09***
(207.80) (367.01)
Log GDP per capita 427.40 3236.08 1178.98 705.77
(1923.94) (8400.14) (2135.62) (12555.75)
Export price index -59.34** -26.31** -20.19 -13.49
(28.61) (9.11) (20.56) (22.56)
N 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.90 0.60 0.78 0.79
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Random Fixed Random Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.7: Panel OLS augmented with income and export price index
two columns of each table use lagged values of the independent variables as controls,
while the last two incorporate exogenous instruments. I report tests for under- and
over-identification in both tables. Also reported are tests for the exclusion restrictions
for a subset of the instruments used, where the null hypothesis is that both the smaller
set of included instruments and the subset of instruments being tested for exogeneity
are valid. The IV diagnostic tests do not indicate an obvious misspecification of the
instrument set. Details on the instruments used are given in Appendix F.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that when instrumenting for levels of log GDP per capita
and the export value/price indices in the regression models, the conditional correlation
between democracy and the disparity in trade policy expenditure remains robust. The
negative correlation between each country’s Polity score and its tariff-subsidy expen-
diture difference, and the positive correlation between the difference and the Freedom
in the World index, shows that dictatorships levy higher values of import duties and
tariffs compared to export subsidy payments than do democracies. This conditional
correlation is in the direction predicted by the model in Section 3.3, and suggests a sys-
tematic pattern between domestic political institutions and a country’s choice between
alternative interventionist trade policies.
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REG13 REG14 REG15 REG16
Log GDP per capita 8140.60*** 8548.57*** 24903.74*** 28630.83***
(1733.75) (1716.11) (9206.85) (10583.84)
Export value index -16.75** -18.33** 10.78 36.01
(8.34) (7.95) (33.43) (52.79)
polity2 -40.87* -177.80*
(21.30) (104.16)
findex 491.65*** 1375.91**
(128.93) (563.81)
N 98 101 128 131
Root MSE 628.09 615.25 1268.33 1458.09
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05
Under-i.d. p 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09
Over-i.d. p 0.72 0.84 0.20 0.18
Exog. test p 0.72 0.84 0.37 0.18
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.8: Panel IV with income and export value index
REG17 REG18 REG19 REG20
Log GDP per capita 41844.11** 95601.94* 11931.26** 12705.78
(18255.76) (54011.25) (5587.18) (11313.45)
Export price index 1.76 17.48 -28.17*** -34.15**
(21.76) (38.58) (5.80) (14.07)
polity2 -1515.13*** -1388.66***
(229.40) (189.38)
findex 4302.88*** 3521.30***
(1282.76) (795.09)
N 41 41 41 41
Root MSE 529.16 1033.00 413.10 619.27
p-value 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01
Under-i.d. p 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07
Over-i.d. p 0.94 0.96 0.23 0.42
Exog. test p 0.90 0.93 0.46 0.78
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.9: Panel IV with income and export price index
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3.4.3 Robustness Checks
As a further robustness check, I perform a similar exercise to the first chapter in this
dissertation, using military sophistication as a time-varying proxy for the exogenous
value of office-holding. Political candidates may value holding political office more if
the government has greater international influence. I proxy for international influence
with military sophistication, defined as the log ratio of military expenditure per per-
sonnel. Military expenditure data is taken from the World Development Indicators and
is expressed in year 2000 U.S. dollars. Total armed forces personnel is also from the
WDI. I augment the IV specification (instrumenting for log GDP per capita and the ex-
port price/value indices) with this proxy for the value of holding office, treating military
sophistication as exogenous to the difference between tariff and subsidy expenditure. Ta-
ble 3.10 shows that incorporating this additional control does not change the qualitative
prediction regarding democracy and the disparity between trade policy expenditure.
REG21 REG22 REG23 REG24
Log GDP per capita 8004.59*** 8997.93*** 31865.02** 53463.48
(2168.16) (2121.98) (16136.31) (36572.19)
Military sophistication 115.72 -37.57 -253.56 3417.16
(482.75) (445.74) (1520.20) (3191.82)
Export value index -18.53** -19.72***
(8.30) (7.62)
Export price index 9.47 -27.68
(19.71) (35.45)
findex 489.13*** 3470.87***
(132.32) (1164.58)
polity2 -43.77** -1497.86***
(21.30) (229.13)
N 97 97 41 41
Root MSE 629.14 592.76 488.84 754.51
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Under-i.d. p 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07
Over-i.d. p 0.75 0.82 0.84 0.74
Exog. test p 0.63 0.72 0.78 0.64
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.10: Panel IV with proxy for value of holding office
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Additionally, it should be noted that while YH in the model reflects citizens’ income
endowments, it also reflects the volume of exports out of the economy. The results in
the above tables can be shown to be robust to controlling for export volumes without
the need to gather additional data. Changes in the export value index can reflect
fluctuations in a country’s export prices as well as its export volume. Incorporating
both the export price index and the export value index in the regression will allow us
to examine the effect of a change in the democracy index on the difference in tariff and
subsidy expenditure, keeping export prices and volumes constant. This is what I do in
Table 3.11. For given levels of export prices and volumes, an increase in the Freedom
in the World index increases tariff expenditure relative to export subsidy expenditure.
A decrease in the Polity index has the same effect. This illustrates that compared to
democratic governments, authoritarian regimes collect higher levels of import tariffs
relative to export subsidy expenditure.
REG25 REG26 REG27 REG28
Export price index 43.94* 9.88 43.04 10.36
(25.42) (13.97) (28.28) (19.47)
Export value index -74.90*** -41.64*** -74.67*** -40.53**
(21.89) (13.52) (22.95) (16.28)
Military sophistication 9.90 -62.23
(1256.83) (769.96)
findex 1664.55* 1673.14*
(878.05) (877.35)
polity2 -975.38*** -983.21***
(202.80) (216.18)
N 41 41 41 41
Root MSE 450.17 356.03 450.41 356.26
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Under-i.d. p 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
Over-i.d. p 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.16
Exog. test p 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.80
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.11: Panel IV controlling for export volume instead of income
Finally, Table 3.12 builds on Table 3.11, with the addition of the import value
index as a control. Data on the import value index were from the World Development
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Indicators. Fluctuations in this index reflect fluctuations in both the price and volume
of imports. While the previous regression specifications controlled for the determinants
of subsidy expenditure sYH suggested by the model, tariff expenditure tPFCF varies
with the prices and quantity of imports, where t is given by equation (3.20). Controlling
for the import value index in the regression allows variations in tariff revenue to reflect
changes in policy rather than changes in the prices and quantity of imports. The first
and second column of Table 3.12 treat the import value index as included (exogenous)
instruments, while the third and fourth column instrument for the import value index.
Data on the instruments used are in Appendix F. The table shows that the previous
results are robust to the inclusion of this additional regressor. For given values of the
import value index, export price index, export quantities, and military sophistication,
an increase in the Polity index (i.e., an increase in the level of democracy) is significantly
associated with lower tariff revenues relative to export subsidy expenditures.
REG29 REG30 REG31 REG32
Export price index -1.05 14.48 1.54 21.97
(27.97) (27.72) (17.91) (24.33)
Export value index -50.69** -46.85** -29.11*** -22.08
(21.52) (23.87) (9.79) (15.18)
Import value index 18.89 2.23 -0.10 -35.01
(40.14) (38.43) (27.14) (35.00)
Military sophistication -397.08 623.10
(943.66) (766.60)
polity2 -1049.85*** -902.29*** -1052.27*** -736.12**
(343.88) (326.34) (258.59) (314.21)
N 41 41 41 41
Root MSE 361.86 360.51 364.20 370.18
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Under-i.d. p 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
Over-i.d. p 0.18 0.14 0.42 0.27
Exog. test p 0.94 0.74 0.29 0.54
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors reported.
Table 3.12: Panel IV controlling for import value index
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3.5 Conclusions
When policymakers are motivated by rent-seeking behavior, trade policies may be more
biased towards import tariffs than export subsidies. Democratic institutions prevailing
in a country can reduce the extent of this bias. This paper has presented a theoretical
model and empirical evidence in support of this finding. While most papers in the trade
literature recast import tariffs as a tool to protect domestic import-competing indus-
tries, thinking about tariffs as a means of enriching opportunistic politicians adds to
our understanding of why (supposedly protectionist) trade policies are systematically
biased against trade—i.e., in favor of import tariffs rather than export subsidies—across
countries (Rodrik 1995). The tight interlinkage between political institutions and pre-
ferred interventionist trade policies, combined with the gradual pace with which political
institutions change, indicate the magnitude of the challenges in negotiating free trade
agreements amongst countries with different attitudes toward democracy and explain
why some trade arrangements find it necessary to address non-trade-related, political
concerns (Aaronson 2007). In lieu of achieving perfect political convergence, interna-
tional trade organizations consisting of members with widely disparate political insti-
tutions may find it easier to address trade barriers which cannot be used for political
rent-seeking, prompting arrangements like the WTO to be stricter on export subsidies
than import tariffs (Potipiti 2012). For further research, it may be promising to in-
vestigate and explain whether this systematic political asymmetry in trade intervention
exists for other policies, such as export taxes versus tariffs, as well as analyze the welfare
effects of the interaction between different political regimes in a multilateral free trade
agreement.
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Appendix F
Details on instruments used
Model Instrument Set Subset of instrments
tested for exogeneity
REG13 1st through 2nd lag of log GDP per capita 1st through 2nd lag
1st through 2nd lag of export value index of log GDP per capita
REG14 1st through 2nd lag of log GDP per capita 1st through 2nd lag
1st through 2nd lag of export price index of log GDP per capita
REG15 Current through 3rd lag of fertility rate Current and lagged
Current and lagged openness openness
REG16 Current and lagged fertility rate Lag of openness
Lag of openness
REG17 3rd through 5th lag of log GDP per capita 3rd through 5th lag
3rd through 5th lag of export price index of log GDP per capita
REG18 3rd through 5th lag of log GDP per capita 3rd through 5th lag
2nd through 5th lag of export price index of log GDP per capita
REG19 Current through 3rd lag of fertility 2nd through 5th lag
2nd through 5th lag of openness of openness
REG20 Current through 3rd lag of fertility 2nd through 5th lag
2nd through 5th lag of openness of openness
REG21 1st through 3rd lag of log GDP per capita 1st to 2nd lag
1st through 2nd lag of export value index of log GDP per capita
REG22 1st through 3rd lag of log GDP per capita 1st to 2nd lag
1st through 2nd lag of export value index of log GDP per capita
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Model Instrument Set Subset of instrments
tested for exogeneity
REG23 2nd through 5th lag of log GDP per capita 2nd to 5th lag
3rd to 5th lag of export price index of log GDP per capita
REG24 3rd through 5th lag of log GDP per capita 3rd to 5th lag
2nd to 5th lag of export price index of log GDP per capita
REG25 Current and lag import share of GDP Current and lag
Current and lag fertility rate import share of GDP
Lag of openness
REG26 Current and lag import share of GDP Current and lag
Current and lag fertility rate import share of GDP
Lag of openness
REG27 Current and lag import share of GDP Current and lag
Current and lag fertility rate import share of GDP
Lag of openness
REG28 Current and lag import share of GDP Current and lag
Current and lag fertility rate import share of GDP
Lag of openness
REG29 Current and lag import share of GDP Import share of GDP
Current and lag fertility
Lag of openness
REG30 Current and lag import share of GDP Import share of GDP
Current and lag fertility
Lag of openness
REG31 Current through third lag of: import Import share of GDP
share of GDP, export share of GDP, Export share of GDP
and fertility rate
REG32 Current through 2nd lag of: import Import share of GDP
share of GDP, export share of GDP, Export share of GDP
and fertility rate
Openness measured as trade (sum of exports and imports) share of GDP.
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